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I. MAKING THE DOLLS 
Imagine you hold a large, unwieldy sheet of paper. The paper is too large. 
You find it hard to carry around, it is cumbersome. You decide to reduce its 
volume. You fold it once and you fold it again. You are still weighed down. You 
make some judicious cuts. You cut some from this edge and from that, but you 
leave a center - a portion you think will be sufficient for your needs. Satisfied, 
you try to place the folded, manicured paper into your portfolio. But as you put it 
in, a breeze stirs and voila! You find a long string of connected shapes - a small 
army of paper dolls. From one you have made many. 
Surely the inventor of paper dolls must have been happy with the trick of 
magically making many from one. Yet members of Congress have been repeat-
edly surprised when efforts at reducing federal court review of immigration deci-
sions produce a perverse multiplication. Angered, frustrated, eager, Congress 
once again picks up the shears. It strips from this corner and that. After Con-
gress cuts, the federal judiciary must now interpret the jurisdictional restriction. 
Federal court jurisdiction is malleable and courts are loathe to find a complete bar 
to judicial review, especially where it involves constitutional questions such as 
individual liberty and fairness. Soon it becomes evident that the adjudicatory 
pattern does not match the legislative intent; the cases fail to fit Congress's de-
sired pattern.1 
Today, jurisdiction over immigration law is by no means well defined by 
clear limits. Instead the paper cutters find an unwieldy, complex mess defined by 
confusion and "loopholes." Limitations on jurisdiction have bred a multitude of 
1 . See infra Part II for a discussion of some of the patterns of federal court interpretation of restrictions on 
jurisdiction. 
38 
NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW VOLUME 51 I 2006/07 
litigation. The number of federal court cases reviewing removal orders has in-
creased 970% in the past ten years.2 As of September 2005, the immigration 
cases represented 18% of the appellate civil docket. 3 
Congress and the courts are not alone in augmenting the number of immi-
gration cases in the federal courts. Congress has also urged the agencies enforcing 
the immigration laws to increase enforcement, to reduce backlogs and to make 
removal more swift and certain. At the same time that Congress was shearing 
away at the forms of judicial review, the Department of Justice and its Executive 
Office for Immigration Review ("EOIR") together with the Department of 
Homeland Security ("DHS") were increasing the number, rate and speed of adju-
dication of removal cases.4 It is not only that Congress made the wrong cuts, it is 
also that the sheer volume of the caseload entering the administrative system has 
increased. 
At its essence, my metaphor points out the failure of Congress and the agen-
cies to recognize that people are not paper dolls. For unlike passive paper dolls, 
the non-citizens opposing their removal from the United States are actors 
animated and motivated to survive. What is at stake is their right to remain in 
the United States. Many non-citizens have spent the majority of their lives here 
or have spouses and children residing here lawfully. The jurisdictional statutes 
and agency procedures focus on the number of removals or on the speed of adjudi-
cation. The metaphor of paper dolls is chillingly accurate as a reflection of a 
system failing to fully acknowledge the human lives involved. 
For these men, women and children in removal proceedings, the incentives 
to litigate beyond the agency have partially increased as a reaction to the narrow-
ing and elimination of prior forms of relief. Prior to 1996, the immigration 
statutes provided many people with a way to regularize their status, to become 
2. Sarah Kroll-Rosenbaum, Noncitizens Access the Federal Courts: How Demand for Review Exceeds Stat-
utory Restriction, Master Trends in the Law 12 (Jan. 28, 2005) (unpublished paper, on file with the New 
York Law School Law Review). See infra note 32 for a discussion of this paper and the methodology 
used. 
3. LEONIDAS RALPH MECHAM, 2005 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR, TABLE B-3, U.S. COURTS OF 
APPEALS-SOURCES OF APPEALS AND ORIGINAL PROCEEDINGS COMMENCED, BY CIRCUIT 114 (2005), 
available at http://www.uscourts.gov/judbus2005/appendices/b3.pdf. 
4. There are various agencies responsible for the enforcement of the immigration law and removal orders in 
particular. The Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement ("ICE") is a subdivision of the Depart-
ment of Homeland Security ("DHS"). It provides the trial attorneys who represent the government posi-
tion in removal proceedings. The U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services ("CIS") provides services 
such as the processing of applications for lawful status and, during removal proceedings, a case may be 
referred to a division of CIS. CIS adjudicators may also refer cases to ICE for initiation of removal 
proceedings. The U.S. Customs and Border Protection ("CBP") is charged with border patrol and customs 
enforcement. See generally U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, http://uscis.gov/graphics/ 
index.htm (last visited July 2, 2006); Immigration and Customs Enforcement, http://www.ice.gov/ 
graphics/index.htm (last visited July 2, 2006); U.S. Customs and Border Protection, http://www.cbp.gov 
(last visited July 2, 2006); Department of Homeland Security, http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic (last visited 
July 2, 2006). 
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"legal" through the removal process. Now, statutory bars on relief are very strict 
and other forms of relief have been entirely eliminated. Thus, the individual 
fights harder either to defeat the government assertion that he or she is subject to 
removal or in the hope that litigation or time will somehow prevent removal. 5 
In this paper, I argue that many of the reforms taken by Congress or by the 
agency, although designed to increase efficiency have, in essence, backfired. I ex-
plore some of the statutory and administrative sources that are contributing to the 
increase in immigration-related federal court cases. I also discuss substantive 
immigration law issues and litigation strategies that, in combination with the 
statutory/regulatory architecture, are adding to the growth in the number of 
cases. I look at the interrelationship of these factors. Only by examining these 
interconnections can we seriously understand the nature of the "problem." In 
fact, depending on our goal for the immigration adjudication system, we might 
conclude that judicial review of removal orders, even at this significant rate, is 
both manageable and essential for the development of our immigration law and 
policy. 
\Vhile this article suggests some ways to achieve greater efficiency, I am 
mindful of the "efficiency conundrum" as identified by Margaret Taylor.6 By 
accepting efficiency as a primary goal, I do not mean to imply that it is the only 
goal of the adjudication system. The ideal system would also guarantee fair and 
individualized procedures and that people are not illegally ordered removed. 
The real challenge in achieving the goal of an efficient but fair adjudication 
system for immigration cases is to recognize that unlike a method of making 
paper dolls, the dynamism inherent in any legal system will always be present. 
Even the closest observation of the existing conditions and interactions, and the 
keenest insights from the pitfalls of the past, will not guarantee the creation of a 
system free from problems. The parties within this world - Congress, the 
courts, the agencies and the individuals facing removal - will adapt and react. 
After discussing some of the problems and the dynamics of the players, this paper 
will suggest reforms aimed at achieving more clarity, efficiency and fairness. 
5. See infra text accompanying notes 54-58. 
6. Margaret H. Taylor, Promoting Legal Representation far Detained Aliens: Litigation and Adminis-
trative Refbrm, 29 CoNN. L. REV. 1647 (1997). Taylor notes that advocates for immigrants have ap-
pealed to the governmental desire for a more efficient immigration enforcement system by arguing that 
providing legal representation to detained aliens will "speed up removal proceedings." Id. at 1709. 
However, she cautions that while this may seem like a logical argument, providing legal representation to 
detained aliens may not save the government time or money. Further, she notes the danger inherent in 
this characterization of the role of attorneys in immigration proceedings - as zealous advocates, attorneys 
for detained aliens should prioritize opposing governmental efforts to remove their clients, not speeding up 
the removal process. Id. 
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II. CONGRESS AND COURT-STRIPPING: CUTTING IS NOT A CURE 
For the past ten years, Congress has tried to reduce the quantity and quality 
of judicial review of administrative removal orders.7 Congress has repeatedly 
tried to both narrow the appeals process and to bar categories of claims and 
claimants from federal court review of these administrative orders.8 Congress 
intended the statute to name specific situations where judicial review of the 
agency decision was preserved in a petition for review to the Court of Appeals 
and to expressly bar petitions for review challenging specific legal claims or made 
by specific categories of people.9 The litigation response was to argue about 
whether a person was within the barred group or making a disfavored claim. 
For example, the Immigration and Nationality Act ("INA") section 242(b) ex-
pressly barred an alien convicted of an aggravated felony as defined in the immi-
gration statute from pursuing a petition for review. Thus, courts had to make a 
legal determination of whether or not the agency correctly found the underlying 
conviction was within the scope of the "aggravated felonies."10 At times the 
7. Removal is a technical term that refers to both deportation and exclusion after a finding of inadmissibility. 
Prior to 1996, the immigration statutes formally had two types of proceedings: one called a deportation 
hearing and the other called an exclusion hearing. Today there is a single type of hearing although the 
burdens of proof and forms of relief continue to vary depending on whether the government is charging a 
non-citizen as an alien removable after admission (removal) or removable upon seeking admission (inad-
missibility). See generally INA § 240, 8 U.S.C. § 1229a (2000). 
8. The Illegal Immigrant Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 
Stat. 3009 [hereinafter IIRIRA] and the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. 
L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 [hereinafter AEDPA] are the major examples. 
9. See Lenni B. Benson, Back to the Future: Congress Attacks the Right to judicial Review of Immi-
gration Proceedings, 29 CONN. L. REV. 1411 (1997) (describing the statutory categories and the context 
of the jurisdictional bars). The other group, disfavored claims, is most dramatically expressed in those 
individuals seeking judicial review of a discretionary decision made by the immigration judge. Almost 
every form of relief in removal proceedings is delegated to the agency's discretion. Daniel Kanstroom has 
written extensively about the intersection of discretion and immigration law. In this symposium, he 
revisits the importance of judicial review over these types of decisions. See Daniel Kanstroom, Sur-
rounding the Hole in the Doughnut: Discretion and Deference in US. Immigration Law, 71 TuL. 
L. REV. 703 (1997); Daniel Kanstroom, The Better Part of Valor: The REAL ID Act, Discretion, 
and the "Rule" of Immigration Law, 51 N.Y.L. ScH. L. REV. 161 (2006). 
10. The definition of "aggravated felony" is long, complex and uses vague categories such as "a crime of 
violence." See generally INA§§ 101(a)(43)(A)-(U), 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(43)(A)-(U) (2000). Crime of 
violence is found in INA§ 101(a)(43)(F) 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(F). Accordingly, the courts had to parse 
the definition of crimes of violence. Splits in the circuits emerged including such as the Ninth and Second 
Circuit Courts of Appeals' rejection that a conviction for driving under the influence would constitute a 
crime of violence under INA§ 101(a)(43)(F). See Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1, 6 (2004). The govern-
ment statistics do not report this specific crime as a separate ground of removal from those removed for 
criminal grounds. The 2003 Yearbook of Immigration Statistics indicate that there were 186,151 
aliens formally removed in 2003. See OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, DEP'T OF HOMELAND 
SEC., 2003 YEARBOOK OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS 158 (2004) [hereinafter YEARBOOK], available at 
http://uscis.gov/graphics/shared/statistics/yearbook/2003/2003ENF.pdf. The yearbooks also indicate that 
in 2003 39,600 aliens were removed for criminal offenses and in 2004 the number increased to 42,510. 
Compare id. at 160, and OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., 2002 
YEARBOOK OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS 189 (2003), available at http://www.uscis.gov/graphics/ 
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agency and courts seemed to be having a ping pong match bouncing back and 
forth complex definitions of which crimes were indeed within this disfavored 
class. 
Courts also had to spend time exercising jurisdiction in order to determine 
whether they had jurisdiction. For those litigants who conceded the statute 
barred petitions for review in the courts of appeals, the vehicle to federal court 
became the statutory writ of habeas corpus found in 28 U.S.C. § 2241. While the 
immigration statutes did not expressly authorize judicial review under this stat-
ute, they also did not expressly limit habeas review. Thus, the Supreme Court 
affirmed that habeas review remained for those shut out of the petition for 
review. 11 
The perverse result was to push more cases into both the courts of appeals, in 
the form of standard petitions for judicial review of administrative orders, 12 and 
into the district courts, in the form of habeas petitions13 challenging removal 
orders. In turn, the courts of appeals also heard appeals from the habeas cases in 
shared/statistics/yearbook/2002/ENF2002.pdf, with OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION STATis·ncs, DEP'T OF 
HOMELAND SEC., 2004 YEARBOOK OF IMMIGRATION STA"I1STICS 16 (2006), available at http:// 
www.uscis.gov/graphics/shared/statistics/yearbook/Y earbook2004.pdf. In contrast, the Eighth and Elev-
enth Circuit Courts of Appeals agreed with the Board of Immigration Appeals that a conviction for 
driving under the influence could indeed be an aggravated felony regardless of the sanction imposed. 
Ultimately, using ordinary rules of statutory interpretation, the Supreme Court rejected the agency's in-
terpretation of the statute and held that driving under the influence was not a crime of violence. See 
Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1 (2004). In Leocal, the petitioner had initially been convicted on a DUI 
charge and ordered removed under BIA and Eleventh Circuit precedent that had found the BIA inclusion 
of DUI convictions as aggravated felonies to be reasonable. See id. at 4-5. Prior to Leocal's filing of a 
petition for review, the BIA changed its mind, finding that DUI convictions would not qualify as an 
aggravated felony and render an alien deportable. Id. at 6 n.2. The BIA, however, declared that it 
would only apply the change in interpretation in circuits that had not already determined the issue. See 
Matter of Ramos, 23 I. & N. Dec. 336, 346-47 (2002). The Eleventh Circuit accordingly rejected the 
petition for review, recognizing that it had already supported the BIA's prior determination that Dills 
were aggravated felonies in Lev. Att'y General, 196 F.3d 1352 (11th Cir. 1999). See Leocal, 543 U.S. 
at 6 n.2. In fact, this decision may ultimately increase litigation as the Supreme Court did not discuss the 
standard rules of deference to agency interpretation. Chief Justice Rehnquist elected to use plain meaning 
interpretation of the statutory language rather than granting deference to the agency's decision. This 
approach was, in part, necessitated by the BIA's reversal of its own interpretation. The Supreme Court 
heard oral argument in October 2006, on the issue of whether state drug convictions qualify as an "aggra-
vated felony" for purposes of immigration laws. See Lopez v. Gonzales, No. 05-547; Toledo-Bores v. 
U.S., No. 05-7664 (cases consolidated), available at http://www.ilw.com/immigdaily/news/2006,0810-
scourt.pd£ 
11. See INS. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289 (2003) (holding that habeas review of removal orders remained 
available because Congress had not included express language suspending it). 
12. INA§ 242(b)(4)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B) (2000). 
13. 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (2000). This is the federal statutory grant of habeas corpus jurisdiction which was 
passed by the first Congress of the United States in 1789. 
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the district courts.14 The net effect was a multiplication of levels and forms of 
judicial review. 1 s 
Most recently, Congress passed the REAL ID Act and took the dramatic step 
of explicitly barring habeas corpus review of removal orders.16 Time will tell 
how this will play out in the courts. In the short term it has meant a transfer of 
all habeas petitions from the district court to the appeals courts, even in cases 
where the district court had heard all arguments and was ready to make a 
decision. 17 
Ill. EXECUTIVE ENFORCEMENT: MORE PAPER 
At the same time that Congress was formally restricting judicial review via 
statutory amendments, the Departments of Justice and Homeland Security were 
increasing enforcement of the deportation/removal statutes and streamlining the 
administrative review process.18 The changes were, and remain, dramatic. In 
2002, the EOIR looked for ways to speed cases through the administrative appel-
14. 28 U.S.C. § 2253 (2000). This statute allows habeas cases to be appealed to the circuit courts of appeals 
and by certiorari to the Supreme Court. This differs from 28 U.S.C. § 2241, which creates original juris-
diction of habeas cases in the federal courts. 
l 5. An example of the ping pong game that occurs when the non-citizen is not given a forum to review the 
decisions of the BIA is illustrated by Flores-Garza v. INS, 328 F.3d 797 (5th Cir. 2003). Flores-Garza 
was lawfully in the United States and was ordered removed because of two convictions. He had initially 
pled guilty to a burglary charge and received a suspended five-year sentence. Twenty years later, Flores-
Garza pled guilty to a second charge of marijuana possession. The IJ determined that he was removable 
because ofboth convictions. Flores-Garza requested relief under INA § 240A, 8 U.S.C. § 1229(b), which 
allows certain permanent residents to request cancellation of removal and adjustment of status but the IJ 
denied the request based on a determination that the crimes were aggravated felonies. The BIA affirmed 
the IJ's decision and dismissed Flores-Garza's appeal. He filed a petition for review of the BIA's final 
order of removal, arguing that the charging document did not include an aggravated felony. While the 
government's motion to dismiss was pending, Flores-Garza filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. 
"Flores's habeas petition raised statutory and constitutional claims and reiterated the arguments raised in 
his petition for review." 328 F.3d at 800. The district court dismissed the habeas petition for lack of 
jurisdiction. Id. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals later dismissed his petition for review of the BIA 
order of removal. Flores-Garza filed a notice of appeal for the dismissal of the habeas petition and a 
motion to reinstate his petition for direct review of the BIA order. The Fifth Circuit granted Flores-
Garza's motion to reinstate the petition for review, and the issues were briefed. The Fifth Circuit consoli-
dated the petition for review with his appeal of the dismissal of the habeas petition, but then found that 
they lacked jurisdiction to review the BIA decision. However, they determined that the district court did 
have jurisdiction to decide the habeas petition. Thus the Fifth Circuit ultimately vacated the district 
court's dismissal and remanded the habeas case to the district court. Id. at 799. If the case is still pending 
there, the REAL ID Act provides for the re-transfer of the case back to the Court of Appeals. 
16. See infra notes 87-90 and accompanying text. 
17. See infra note 87 (discussing the REAL ID Act). 
l 8. See supra note 4 for a description of the agencies. While the statutory reorganization in 2002 was 
intended to allow coordination of immigration and national security, the reorganization did not give 
DHS total control because it left the immigration administrative courts within the Department of Justice. 
This is an odd structure for efficiency. One agency can set an agenda without coordination with the other 
agency and the values of one may not be shared by another. Moreover, the multiple agencies increase the 
complexity of coordination of actions within the cases and communication among the key participants. 
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late process, where the Board of Immigration Appeals ("BIA") hears the adminis-
trative appeals from individual removal orders. 19 These changes sought to 
reduce the backlog but at the same time the Attorney General reduced the number 
of BIA members from twenty-three to eleven.20 Among other changes, the re-
forms authorized the review of the administrative hearing below by a single 
member of the BIA rather than the existing practice of review by a panel of three 
members.21 Further, that member could summarily affirm the Immigration 
Judge's ("IJ") decision without an opinion.22 Most importantly, the BIA altered 
the standard of administrative review. Rather than reviewing the decision de 
nova as it has always done previously, the new regulations limit de nova re-
view to issues of law or the exercise of discretion and declare that findings of fact 
will be reviewed only on a clearly erroneous standard. 23 
19. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1 (2006). Although these regulations became final in 2002, the BIA had been working to 
reduce its backlog through a variety techniques including a pilot project that utilized a process known as 
"Affirmance Without Opinion." This change was promulgated in Streamlining, 64 Fed. Reg. 56, 135 
(Oct. 18, 1999). See generally John R.B. Palmer, et al., Why Are So Many People Challenging Board 
ef Immigration Appeals Decisions in Federal Court? An Empirical Analysis ef the Recent Surge in 
Petitions far Review, 20 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 1 (2005); Emily D. Stein, The Due Process Implications of 
the Board of Alien Appeals' Streamlining (May 2004) (unpublished paper, on file with the New York 
Law School Law Review). See Procedural Reforms to Improve Case Management, 67 Fed. Reg. 54,878 
(Aug. 26, 2002) (adopting final regulations supporting streamlining and explaining the pressures on the 
BIA to reduce its backlog and handle its incoming cases). 
For a detailed analysis of the BIA reforms, see DoRSEY & WHITNEY, LLP, STUDY CONDUCTED FoR 
THE AMERICAN BAR AssocJATION CoMM1ss10N ON IMMIGRATION PoucY, PRACTICE AND PRo BoNo 
RE: BOARD OF IMMIGRATION APPEALS: PROCEDURAL REFORMS TO IMPROVE CASE MANAGEMENT 
(2003), availableat http://www.dorsey.com/files/upload/DorseyStudyABA_8mgPDF.pd£ 
20. Procedural Reforms to Improve Case Management, 67 Fed. Reg. 54,878, 54,879 (Aug. 26, 2002) (codi-
fied at 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1). While it may seem perverse to reduce appellate administrative judges when 
the agency faced a huge backlog, the Attorney General removed from the BIA those members who were 
most likely to provide dissents or to write concurring opinions that suggested alternative legal analysis. 
The Dorsey Study cited above contains a productivity study of the BIA. Today, the BIA's support staff has 
grown quite large and the initial screening mechanism for determining which cases fit streamlining crite-
ria are handled by staff attorneys. There are currently 115 staff attorneys and ten paralegals who support 
BIA members. E-mail from Elaine Komis, EOIR Legislative and Public Affairs, to Roderick Potts, 
Research Assistant, New York Law School (July 27, 2005, 03:22 EST) (on file with the New York Law 
School Law Review). 
21 . 8 C.F.R. § 1003.l(f)(l) (2006). 
22. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.l(a)(7) (2006). 
23. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.l(d)(3) (2006). The clearly erroneous standard was apparently adopted from Rule 52 of 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and is the standard an appellate court uses to review the findings of 
fact made in a bench trial. Of course, in a civil court proceeding, the findings are also shaped by the 
Federal Rules of Evidence. These rules do not formally or habitually apply in immigration proceedings, a 
species of administrative hearings. For a thoughtful critique of this standard and a query about why no 
cases had resulted in reversal one year after the adoption of this higher standard, see Lory Diana Rosen-
berg, Separate Opinion: Independence and Deference Under the Clearly Erroneous Standard ef 
Review, 8 BENDER'S IMMIGR. Bm.L. 1805 (2003). 
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These streamlining changes were extremely successful in lowering the BIA' s 
backlog of cases.24 Even as more and more appeals were filed for the consecutive 
years, the BIA still managed to lessen its backlog considerably (by the thousands 
for each year that cases were filed). Generally, of the cases that were pending in 
the BIA in September of 2004, over 84% had been adjudicated by the following 
year. 25 Figure 1 shows the dramatic decrease over time in the backlog. 
U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B) (2000). If the BIA is not reviewing the factual findings or is summarily affirming 
the IJ opinion, the decision of the single administrative officer becomes the entire support for the factual 
basis of removal. IJ decisions are frequently dictated at the end of the administrative proceeding and may 
or may not include citation to the documents or exhibits in the case. 
I was only able to find a single reported BIA case reversing the IJ using this standard of "clearly errone-
ous." See Matter of Budi Santoso, 31 Immig. Rptr. Bl-15 (BIA 2005). The IJ's decision on the credibil-
ity of the non-citizen's statements was based entirely on the fact he had not filed his asylum application in 
a timely manner. The case appears to be fairly extreme, for the BIA commented about the complete 
absence of the usual criteria for determining credibility. "Notably, the Immigration Judge did not cite to 
any inconsistencies or discrepancies between the respondent's testimony and his application or accompany-
ing statement. He made no mention of the respondent's demeanor, and he did not express any concerns 
over the reliability or authenticity of the respondent's documentary evidence. Instead, the immigration 
judge concluded that 'the respondent did not experience these incidents to which he testified,' because 'a 
reasonable person' who had endured such suffering 'would have made an application for asylum' sooner 
(I.J. at 6)." Id. 
After I presented this paper, Walter H. Ruehle, an attorney in Buffalo, New York, sent me a redacted 
unpublished BIA decision where the BIA also found clear error. In this unpublished case dated March 11, 
2005, the BIA found that the IJ's findings that the petitioner lacked credibility were not based on material 
findings nor supported by the record. 
Unfortunately, this pattern reminds me of an earlier time when Congress chose to put reliance on a single 
examiner. See, e.g., Nishimura Eiku v. United States, 142 U.S. 651 (1892) (the finding of the border 
officer is conclusive and sufficient to determine who may be admitted); see also Lucy SALYER, LAWS 
HARSH AS TIGERS: CHINESE IMMIGRANTS AND THE SHAPING OF MODERN IMMIGRATION LAw(1995). 
In this historical assessment of the administration of the immigration laws at the turn of the twentieth 
century, Salyer points out how often the officer's decision could be based on bias or erroneous stereotyping 
and how insulation from judicial review shaped the adjudication culture. Id. at 136-56. 
2 4. The statistical analysis of the BIA workload and the relationship to the increase in the federal courts 
caseload is largely based on the detailed and excellent analysis prepared by Sarah Kroll-Rosenbaum. See 
Kroll-Rosenbaum, supra note 2. 
25. OFFICE OF PLANNING, ANALYSIS, & TECH., EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW, FY 2005 
STATISTICAL YEAR BooK, Ul (2006), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/eoir/statspub/fy05syb.pdf. On 
September 30, 2004, there were 89 cases pending that had been filed before 2001. A year later, by 
September 30, 2005, there were only 36. For cases filed in 2001, the number went from 72 to 15; for 
2002, 379 to 62; for 2003, 5,877 to 169; for 2004, 28,847 to 5,189. Id. 
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Still, the streamlining itself led to two types of litigation. First, there were 
and continue to be challenges to the process itsel£ By and large, these cases have 
resulted in the courts of appeals finding that the single BIA member review and 
altered standards by themselves did not deny a non-citizen due process of law.27 
The second form of litigation challenges the accuracy and merits of the BIA deci-
sion itsel£ The non-citizen who disagreed with the IJ's assessments and receives 
a summary affirmance via the streamlining regulations had no opportunity to 
have that decision tested except via judicial review in federal court.28 Moreover, 
the complexity of the immigration law itself increased in the incentives to seek 
further review. A study produced by Dorsey & Whitney, LLP29 found that the 
large number of new immigration cases and novel legal issues may have also 
contributed to judicial review of BIA decisions. 30 
26. Id. 
27. See, e.g., Ngure v. Ashcroft, 367 F.3d 975 (8th Cir. 2004); Falcon Carriche v. Ashcroft, 335 F.3d 1009 
(9th Cir. 2003); Georgis v. Ashcroft, 328 F.3d 962 (7th Cir. 2003); Mendoza v. U.S. Att'y Gen., 327 
F.3d 1283 (11th Cir. 2003); Soadjede v. Ashcroft, 324 F.3d 830 (5th Cir. 2003) (per curiam); Albathani 
v. I.N.S., 318 F.3d 365 (lst Cir. 2003); see also Stein, supra note 19. Some circuit courts have raised 
questions as to the propriety of the use of the streamlining provisions in certain circumstances. See, e.g., 
Smriko v. Ashcroft, 387 F.3d 279 (3d Cir. 2004); Zhu v. Ashcroft, 382 F.3d 521 (5th Cir. 2004); Haoud 
v. Ashcroft, 350 F.3d 201 (1st Cir. 2003). 
28. In some cases it is possible that the non-citizen would file a motion to reconsider or reopen with the BIA 
pointing out the errors of the streamlining decisions. Strategically, an attorney may hesitate to bring a 
motion to reconsider rather than directly seeking judicial review because the regulations limit the non-
citizen to a single motion except in limited circumstances. Attorneys might choose to let the federal court of 
appeals or the district court, in a habeas proceeding, remand the case and thus win the reopening rather 
than "waste" the motion to reconsider or reopen. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c) (2006) (only a single motion to 
reopen authorized unless joined by counsel for the government). 
29. See DORSEY & WHITNEY, LLP, supra note 19. 
30. Id. at 13. The study points to nine statutes promulgated by Congress, including the Patriot Act, that have 
contributed to the complexity of issues that are considered at the administrative level and upon review by 
the courts of appeals. Id. at 14. The courts of appeals appear to be growing increasingly frustrated by the 
BIA's summary affirmances. In Lanza v. Ashcrefi, 389 F.3d 917 (9th Cir. 2004), the Ninth Circuit 
Court of Appeals recognized that the BIA had summarily affirmed a decision of an IJ that may have 
touched on issues that fell outside of the Court of Appeals' jurisdiction. However, the court could not know 
what basis the BIA relied on for its affirmance without an opinion to review. The court had no choice but 
to remand the case to the BIA for a clarification of the grounds for its summary affirmance, just so they 
could later determine a threshold jurisdictional question. In the nine months following Lanza, the Ninth 
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The details of the administrative streamlining are beyond the scope of this 
article; however, the statutory restrictions and litigation about the nature of ju-
risdiction itself combined with increased enforcement and administrative appel-
late streamlining to create an explosion in the workload of the federal courts.31 
How large an explosion? As noted above, the total number of federal court cases 
reviewing orders of the BIA has increased 970% in the past ten years.32 This 
enormous increase means that immigration cases represent more than 18% of the 
federal appellate court civil docket.33 Further, the BIA cases make up a remarka-
ble 88.2% of all administrative appeals heard in the courts of appeals.34 
Focusing on the period between 2000 and 2004, BIA appeals have soared 
almost 357% since 2000 and have more than doubled in every circuit since 
Circuit remanded twenty-four decisions to the BIA for the same clarification. Other circuit courts have 
begun to find that the BIA is glossing over complex jurisdictional issues. See, e.g., Zhu v. Ashcroft, 382 
F.3d 521, 527 (5th Cir. 2004) (describing how the BIA summary affirmance created a "jurisdictional 
conundrum"); Gjyzi v. Ashcroft, 386 F.3d 710, 716 (6th Cir. 2004) ("[T]he failure of the BIA to explain 
its decision in this case unnecessarily frustrates our review."); Lin v. Dep't of Justice, 132 F. App'x 920, 
923 (2d Cir. 2005) (remanding the case seven years after the IJ decision because it was unclear on what 
grounds BIA affirmed). 
31 . For an assessment of the streamlining regulations see Evelyn H. Cruz, Double the Injustice, Twice the 
Harm: The Impact of the Board ef Immigration Appeals' Summary Affirmance Procedures, 16 
STAN. L. & PoL'Y REV 481 (2005). I also benefitted from a paper by a NYLS honors student. See also 
Stein, supra note 19. 
32. Kroll-Rosenbaum, supra note 4, at 12 (citing LEONIDAS RALPH MECHAM, 2004 ANNUAL REPORT OF 
THE DIRECTOR, TABLE B-3, U.S. COURTS OF APPEALS-SOURCES OF APPEALS AND ORIGINAL PRO-
CEEDINGS COMMENCED, BY CIRCUIT, available at http://www.uscourts.gov/judbus2004/appendices/b3 
.pdf). She determined that for every BIA appeal filed in 1993, 970 were filed in 2004. Id. The figure 
reflects the percentage increase in the number of BIA appeals from 1993 to 2004, but does not take into 
account the increase in the total docket of the courts of appeals over that time frame. The dramatic 
increase in BIA appeals since 1993 constitutes approximately two-thirds of the total increase in the wor-
kload for the courts of appeals. The dramatic increase has been reported in other terms. For example, one 
account reported a 781 % increase in the monthly appeals from the BIA to the Second Circuit Court of 
Appeals during the twelve months between February 2002 and February 2003. See Immigration Ap-
peals Surge in Courts, THE THIRD BRANCH (Admin. Office of the U.S. Courts Office of Public Affairs, 
Washington, D.C.), Sept. 2003, available at http://www.uscourts.gov/ttb/sep03ttb/immigration/ 
index.html. See also CoMM. ON FED. COURTS, Ass'N OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF N.Y., THE SURGE 
OF IMMIGRATION APPEALS AND ITS IMPACT ON THE SECOND CIRCUIT CouRT OF APPEALS (2004), 
available at http://www.abcny.org/pdf/report/ AppealSurgeReport.pdf. 
33. MECHAM, supra note 3, at 114. There has also been a large increase in the federal courts' criminal docket 
related to the prosecution of immigration-related offenses. From 2003 to 2004, immigration appeals 
ranked second in overall criminal appeals filings, behind appeals involving drugs. OFFICE OF JUDGES 
PROGRAMS, STATISTICS DIVISION, AoMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, FEDERAL JUDICIAL 
CASELOAD STATISTICS 9 (2004), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/caseload2004/front/judbus04.pdf. 
"Criminal appeals rose 4 percent in 2004 to 12,056, mainly because of increases in filings related to 
firearms and immigration violations." Id. at 8. This paper does not address those criminal prosecutions 
that were regular criminal cases and not judicial review of administrative proceedings. 
34. MECHAM, supra note 3, at 88. Of the 12,255 administrative appeals made in 2004, 10,812 of them were 
from the BIA. Id. I note the irony that most administrative law casebooks pay little, if any, attention to 
immigration cases. 
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2002. 35 "The surge in BIA appeals has particularly stretched the resources of the 
Ninth and Second Circuits, which received 47 percent and 25 percent, respec-
tively, of all BIA petitions filed in 2004."36 In those circuits, immigration cases 
now make up more than thirty percent of all cases. 37 The circuits are hearing 
almost as many administrative appeals as criminal appeals. A significant por-
tion of those appeals have come from asylum-seekers challenging final orders of 
removal and denial of asylum relie£38 Moreover, as evidenced by the chart be-
low, the rate of increase has not been incremental. As several authors have char-
acterized it, there has been a "surge" in immigration cases.39 





































The increase in the number of cases in the federal courts is not explained by 
the increase in the workload of the agency alone. The rate of people seeking 
review of the BIA decisions has also dramatically increased.40 What is motivat-
35. OFFICE OF JuoGES PROGRAMS, STATISTICS DIVISION, AoMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, supra 
note 33, at 8. The Administrative Office further concluded that the surge in BIA filings since 2000 can be 
mostly attributed to changes made by the 2002 streamlining guidelines for processing BIA cases. Id. 
36. Id; see also Palmer, et al., supra note 19. 
37. See Adam Liptak, Courts Criticize judges' Handling ef Asylum Cases, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 26, 2005, at 
A6. 
38. See Palmer, et al., supra note 19, at 71-72. The authors estimate that of BIA appeals of IJ decisions 
within the Second Circuit, Chinese asylum-seekers make up between thirty-five and fifty-five percent of 
the population of the petitions for review. Id. at 72. The workload of decisions within the Ninth Circuit 
is distributed more widely between asylum and non-asylum claims. Id. The authors suggest that the 
relatively high rate of appeal in these two circuits may be due to the relatively high percentage of asylum-
seekers in those two geographic regions. Id. 
39. Id. at 3 & n.1; see also COMM. ON FED. COURTS, Ass'N OF THE BAR OF THE CnY OF N.Y., supra note 
32. 
40. John R.B. Palmer, The Nature and Causes ef the Immigration Surge in the Federal Courts ef 
Appeals: A Preliminary Analysis, 51 N.Y.L. Sett. L. REv. 13 (2006); see also Palmer et al., supra note 
19. These authors discovered a 34% total appeal rate for all circuits, lead by the high number and rate of 
appeals of BIA cases which ultimately are heard by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals ( 42% of the BIA 
cases arising in the Second Circuit are appealed) and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals ( 45% of the BIA 
cases arising in the Ninth Circuit are appealed). Id. at 53-54. From May to August 2004, the BIA 
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ing these litigants? In this section I explore some of the strategic reasons litigants 
are seeking review in the federal court. I also discuss some of the characteristics 
of the repeat players in the system. 
In the initial administrative removal hearing the responding non-citizen 
may contest the allegations of the government charging document, the Notice to 
Appear, or may concede his or her removability.41 While there are no detailed 
published statistical studies, the government reports that in a significant percent-
age of cases the non-citizen does not appear.42 The IJ proceeds with an in absen-
tia order of removal and the administrative case is final. 43 Recently, the EOIR 
reported a large increase in the number of in absentia orders, from 47,408 in 
2004 to 100,994 in 2005.44 In another large percentage of the cases, the non-
citizen facing removal concedes the allegations and moves directly to request a 
statutory form of relief from removal.45 In 1996 Congress greatly restricted the 
forms of relief. For example, in the past an individual might have been able to 
admit that he or she was removable, ask for voluntary departure and then apply 
for an immigrant visa at the U.S. consulate abroad based on a sponsoring em-
ployer or family member. Since 1996 departure from the United States after a 
issued 11,296 final orders and of these, 6514 petitions for review were filed in those two circuits alone. 
Id. at 54. 
4 l. See generally INA§ 240, 8 U.S.C. § 1229a (2000) (describing removal proceedings). 
42. In 2003, a small sample indicated that 66% of non-citizens failed to appear for their hearings and were 
ordered removed in absentia. See OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL EVALUATION AND INSPEC-
TIONS DIV., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, THE IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE'S REMOVAL OF 
ALIENS IssUED FINAL ORDERS, REPORT NUMBER I-2003-004 13 (2003), available at http:// 
www.usdoj.gov/oig/reports/INS/e0304/final.pdf ('We examined the in absentia rate within our sample 
of 308 nondetained cases and found that 204 (66%) of the aliens failed to appear for their removal pro-
ceedings and were ordered removed in absentia. We examined the correlation between removals and 
court attendance and found that the aliens' failure to appear before the Immigration Judge at removal 
proceedings is a significant and strong negative indicator for the likelihood of removal by the INS. Of the 
204 aliens ordered removed in absentia [sic], only 14 had been removed, a removal rate of 7 percent. In 
contrast, 26 of the 103 aliens who attended the hearing where they received their removal order had been 
removed, a rate of 25 percent."). 
43. Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, § 545(a), 104 Stat. 4978, 5063; 8 C.F.R. § 1003.26(b) 
(2006). If the person later comes to the attention of the government, he or she can be removed without 
further administrative action. Some people who are subject to in absentia orders later seek to reopen their 
case administratively or challenge the validity of the in absentia order in federal court. See, e.g., Matter 
of Ester Koka Kalonji, 27 Immig. Rptr. Bl-80 (April 14, 2003) (finding exceptional circumstances and 
ordering the case reopened even though she had notice of original hearing); Sabir v. Gonzales, 421 F.3d 
456 (7th Cir. 2005) (reversing BIA finding about the actual receipt of notice); see also Lopez v. Ashcroft, 
267 F. Supp. 2d 150 (D. Mass. 2003) (affirming a denial of a motion to reopen). 
44. OFFICE OF PLANNING, ANALYSIS, & TECH., EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW, supra note 
26, at H2. For analysis purposes, the EOIR combines in absentia orders with administrative closures 
where the IJ does not order the alien removed, under the category of "Failures to Appear." Between 2004 
and 2005, there was a 103% increase in Failure to Appear completions. However, 52% of the completions 
occurred in just two Immigration Courts, in San Antonio and Harlingen, Texas. Id. at Hl. 
4 5. Immigration Judges are not empowered to grant relief in a general equitable sense but can only consider 
those forms of relief from removal authorized by statute. 
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period of unlawful presence triggers a three- or ten-year bar on returning to the 
United States.46 Many people subject to these bars are not eligible for any waiv-
ers. Even though qualified to immigrate under the preference categories, statu-
tory bars on adjustment of status within the U.S. and bars on return if they 
depart create an incentive to delay the departure. 47 Congress has also limited or 
eliminated waivers for those convicted of crimes, even minor crimes, and created 
statutory bars to asylum. 48 The form of relief previously called "suspension of 
deportation"49 that allowed adjustment after seven years of physical presence, 
proof of good moral character, and proof of hardship to the individual facing 
removal was transformed into "cancellation of removal." Congress expanded the 
residence period to ten years and now requires that the individual prove his or 
her deportation will create exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to a U.S. 
citizen or permanent resident spouse, parent or child. 50 
Today an attorney advising a client about his or her defenses to removal is 
more likely to suggest contesting the allegations of removability, especially where 
the government allegations characterize a criminal conviction as an "aggravated 
felony."51 The consequences of allowing the allegation of aggravated felony to 
stand include not just preclusion from most forms of relief but also a lifetime bar 
to naturalization and potentially to ever regaining lawful residence in the 
United States.52 The government lawyers and Congress may object that the in-
46. See INA§ 212(a)(9), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9) (2000); Sonia Chen, The Illegal Immigration Reform and 
Immigrant Responsibility Act ef 1996: Another Congressional Hurdle far the Courts, 8 IND. ]. 
GLOBAL LEG. STUD. 169, 184-85 (2000) (describing the bars under INA § 212(a)(9)); Emma 0. Guz-
man, The Dynamics of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act ef 1996: 
The Splitting-Up ef American Families, 2 SCHOLAR 95 (2000) (describing the terrible choices a non-
citizen has to make when they are undocumented and unable to leave the country for fear of the ten-year 
bars). 
47. See INA§§ 212(a)(9), 245. See generally, Stephen Yale-Loehr & Brian Palmer, Un/a~/ Presence 
Update, 6 BENDER'S IMMIGR. BuLL. 507 (2001) (describing the different bars applicable when a person 
is unlawfully present within the United States). 
48. See generally DAN KEsSELBRENNER, IMMIGRATION LAW AND CRIMES (2002). This treatise explores 
the many varied immigration consequences of criminal convictions. 
49. INA§ 244(a)(l), 8 U.S.C. § 1254(a)(l) (repealed 1996). 
50. See INA§ 240A, 8 U.S.C. § 1229b (2000); Bruce A. Hake, Hardship Standards, 7 BENDER'S IMMIGR. 
BULL. 59 (2002). 
51. See INA§ 101(a)(43). Those unfamiliar with this long statutory definition may not be aware that the 
label, aggravated felony, has been broadened to include crimes that are only misdemeanors under the 
relevant state, foreign or federal statute. Recently the BIA found that "unauthorized use of a vehicle" 
qualified as an aggravated felony because the BIA accepted the government's assertion that it was a "crime 
of violence." See In re Brieva-Perez, 23 I&N Dec. 766 (BIA 2005). The decision is of questionable 
validity given the Supreme Court's prior decision in Leocal v. Ashcrefi, discussed supra note 10; unfor-
tunately, the BIA did not distinguish Leocal in its opinion. This is just one example of the broad scope of 
criminal convictions that the government may classify as an aggravated felony under immigration law. 
See also Lopez v. Gonzalez, No. 05-547; Toledo-Flores v. U.S., No. 05-7664 (cases consolidated), dis-
cussed supra note 10. 
52. See INA§ 101(0, 8 U.S.C. § llOl(f) (2000); INA § 212(a)(9)(A)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(A)(I). 
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dividuals who challenge these classifications are merely obstructing removal or 
litigating to buy time, but given what is at stake, it is understandable that attor-
neys and pro se litigants challenge the allegation. Indeed, they have been fairly 
successful. In a significant number of cases, the agency has found that its charac-
terization of a conviction has been based on an erroneous reading of the immi-
gration statutes.53 
Put another way, in the past if a client was facing removal due to a crimi-
nal conviction, many attorneys would not spend time or money contesting 
whether the grounds for conviction were in fact the same as the grounds for 
deportability. Instead, the attorney would recommend to the client that he or she 
concede removability and instead seek relief from removal such as the discretion-
ary section "212(c)" waiver that was previously available to long term perma-
nent residents. 54 Because the waiver required the IJ to find that the person was 
unlikely to commit another crime and had experienced some type of rehabilita-
tion, attorneys and clients feared antagonizing the IJ by first litigating the tech-
nical statutory grounds of removal. 55 
Another factor increasing the incentive to litigate is the statutory preclusion 
of seeking judicial review of a discretionary decision. 56 While judicial review of 
immigration discretionary decisions was always deferential - the court had to 
find that the agency acted in an arbitrary or capricious manner to reverse a 
53. See, e.g., Gill v. INS, 420 F.3d 82, 91 (2d Cir. 2005) (holding that BIA erroneously found that attempted 
reckless assault was an aggravated felony); Lara-Cazares v. Gonzales, 408 F.3d 1217, 1218 (9th Cir. 
2005) (holding that BIA erroneously found that gross vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated was an 
aggravated felony); Argaw v. Ashcroft, 395 F.3d 521, 523 (4th Cir. 2005) (legal determination that khat, 
a traditional herbal stimulant, is a controlled substance was incorrect, "[b ]ecause khat is not listed as a 
controlled substance and it has not been established when khat might contain a controlled substance"); 
Knapik v. Ashcroft, 384 F.3d 84, 93 (3d Cir. 2004) (reversing the BIA's finding that "attempted reckless 
endangerment in the first degree" was a crime involving moral turpitude); Garcia-Lopez v. Ashcroft, 334 
F.3d 840, 846 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that BIA erroneously rejected the state court's determination that 
the crime of stealing a purse was a misdemeanor and petty offense); Francis v. Reno, 269 F.3d 162, 
174-75 (3d Cir. 2001) (explaining that the Pennsylvania statute defined homicide by vehicle as a misde-
meanor and the BIA erroneously rejected that definition and charged removability based on an aggra-
vated felony of a "crime of violence"); Coronado-Durazo v. INS, 123 F.3d 1322, 1325 (9th Cir. 1997) 
(holding the BIA erroneously found that solicitation to possess cocaine was an aggravated felony). 
54. The section 212(c) waiver was the subject of litigation in INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289 (2003). Basically 
the waiver allowed long-term residents of the U.S. to seek a discretionary waiver of deportation notwith-
standing criminal conduct or other characteristics that might render them subject to removal. Congress 
repealed the waiver in 1996. But in INS v. St. Cyr, the Supreme Court found the waiver was not 
completely retroactive. 
5 5. I base this understanding of the strategies in removal proceedings in part on my ten years of practice 
experience. See also MANUEL v ARGAS, REPRESENTING NoNCITIZEN CRIMINAL DEFENDANTS IN NEW 
YORK STATE (3d ed. 2003). 
56. See, e.g., INA § 208, 8 U.S.C. § 1158 (2000) (grant of asylum is discretionary); INA § 240A, 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1229b (grant of cancellation of removal is discretionary); INA § 245, 8 U.S.C. § 1255 (adjustment of 
status is discretionary). Almost every form of relief from removal is, by statute, committed to the discre-
tion of the Attorney General and therefore delegated to the discretion of the IJ or BIA. 
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discretionary decision - in 1996 Congress blocked judicial review of all decisions 
committed to the discretion of the agency. 57 Knowing there is no judicial review 
of the discretionary decision, an attorney may now recharacterize litigation to 
raise constitutional or statutory issues. Barring review of the act of discretion has 
frequently only shifted the litigation strategy not eliminated litigation. There-
fore, foreclosing judicial review of the discretionary decisions raised the stakes for 
the agency's adjudication of other issues and increased the likelihood that the 
predicate legal facts of either removability or of qualification for the discretionary 
relief would be litigated. 58 
For those people seeking asylum in the United States, the petition for review 
is the last chance to have a claim to refugee status recognized. Since the creation 
of the statutory right to seek asylum in 1980, Congress has preserved the right of 
an applicant to seek judicial review of the agency rejection of a claim of asylum. 
At times, Congress has restricted the time period to seek asylum or created statu-
tory bars to eligibility for asylum relief; but in general, the law of asylum has 
developed on a case-by-case basis before the BIA and after review in the federal 
courts of appeals. In some circuits, a large percentage of the cases on appeal are 
from people seeking asylum. 59 Preliminary studies suggest that the increase in 
appeals is due to streamlined review before the administrative agency. 60 Several 
of the attorneys I interviewed for this paper suggested that they were now seek-
ing federal court review of denial in asylum cases because of the poor quality of 
the reasoning in the administrative process and because the majority of the asy-
lum claims were based on the IJ rejecting the credibility of the applicant. 61 While 
judicial review of credibility determinations is extremely deferential in adminis-
trative law, many of these attorneys pointed to the number of appellate decisions 
where the federal courts chastised the agency adjudication for poor reasoning, 
irrational conclusions and failure to adequately consider evidence in the record. 62 
The circuit courts have also openly criticized individual IJs for inappropriate 
57. See INA§ 242(a)(2)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B). 
58. See, e.g., Kalaw v. INS, 133 F.3d 1147 (9th Cir. 1997). For a discussion of the effects of administrative 
foreclosure of discretionary judicial review of administrative determinations after the REAL ID Act, see 
Daniel Kanstroom, The Better Part of Valor: The REAL ID Act, Discretion, and "Rule" of Immi-
gration Law, 51 N.Y.L. Sett. L. REV. 161 (2006). 
59. See Palmer, et al., supra note 19, at 71-72. 
60. See DORSEY & WHITNEY, LLP, supra note 19. 
61 . Attorney Interviews conducted August, September, and October of 2005 (notes on file with author). See 
irifra note 105. Based on my informal interviews of several private and government attorneys, a large 
number of the petition for review cases are "settled" by the parties in the sense that the case is remanded to 
the BIA. One of the main reasons for these settlements is the government counsel's opinion that the record 
reflects errors that would weaken the government's support of the BIAIIJ decision. 
62. See Pamela A. MacLean, Circuit Court Review: judges Blast Immigration Rulings, NATL L.J. (Oct. 
14, 2005), at Sl. 
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comments on the testimony of asylum applicants.63 In rare cases, the court has 
awarded attorney's fees to the respondent's counsel. 64 The Attorney General, in 
response to increasing media scrutiny, recently issued a memorandum expressing 
great concern at the growing number of low quality decisions and lack of respect 
shown by some of the IJs.65 
Attorneys increasingly believe that petitions for review are worthwhile. 
Even if the court does not reverse every case, the attorneys believe they are edu-
cating the court and the agency below that some behavior will not be tolerated. 
One attorney told me that more than 50% of his cases were remanded. While 
some of these cases were the result of formal opinions, more often, the remands 
were as a result of stipulated settlements.66 In his view, the petition for review 
was often the first time that a government attorney who exercised real thought 
and discretion reviewed the case.67 This ability to get the attorney's review was 
a prime motivator in seeking review. 
Finally, the increased use of detention has raised the incentive to litigate 
and created new litigation forms. Parties now litigate not only the predicate 
allegations that render them subject to detention, but also the length of deten-
tion. 68 The use of detention in civil proceedings will always trigger constitu-
tional inquiries into the liberty of the detained people. Thus, as long as the 
63. See Wang v. Att'y Gen., 423 F.3d 260 (3d Cir. 2005) (criticizing the court for "unduly harsh character 
judgments"). This case and others are discussed in Christine B. LaBrie, Third Circuit Describes "Dis-
turbing Pattern of If Misconduct" In Asylum Cases, available at http://www.ilw.com/articles/ 
2005,1027-labrie.shtm (last visited Aug. 28, 2006). 
64. See Johnson v. Gonzales, No. 03-1931 (3d Cir. 2005) (finding that the asylum petitioner was entitled to 
attorneys' fees of $10,000 because the agency's decision was not supported by substantial evidence where it 
failed to consider the petitioner's testimony and awarding attorneys' fees under the Equal Access to Justice 
Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2412, which allows a private party to recover attorneys' fees if he or she is the prevailing 
party). 
65. Memorandum from U.S. Attorney General to Immigration Judges (Jan. 9, 2006), http:// 
www.humanrightsfirst.info/pdf/06202-asy-ag-memo-ijs.pdf (last visited June 28, 2006) [hereinafter 
Memorandum]. The New York Times has published a number of front-page stories exposing some of the 
most egregious of these decisions. See, e.g., Nina Bernstein, New York's Immigration Courts Lurch 
Under a Growing Burden, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 8, 2006, at Al; Liptak, supra note 37. Other papers have 
published similar stories. See Abdon M. Pallasch & Natasha Korecki, Judges Fight Speedy Deporta-
tions; Appeals Court Here Slams Immigration jurists' Decisions, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Nov. 14, 2004, 
at 13. 
66. The remands after mediation or settlement are also discussed in the report of the Committee on Federal 
Courts Association of the Bar of the City of New York, supra note 32. 
67. See Attorney Interviews, supra note 61. 
68. See Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510 (2003) (upholding detention of a lawful permanent resident pending 
removal proceedings); see also Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371 (2005) (rejecting indefinite detention of 
inadmissible aliens who were not able to return to their country and the government had ceased efforts to 
return them); Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001) (requiring periodic review of the detention of 
those subject to an order of removal but for whom the government cannot secure cooperation from the 
receiving country). 
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agencies increase the use of detention or Congress mandates it, they can expect 
litigation. 69 
The agencies' particular patterns of detention also contribute to an increase 
in litigation. The government has a pattern of relocating non-citizens to large 
detention centers, often far from the family and attorneys of the non-citizen. 70 
For example, an individual arrested at the airport in New York is sent to deten-
tion centers in New Jersey or in York, Pennsylvania.71 An individual appre-
hended in Nevada may be interned in Eloy, Arizona.72 Many of these detained 
individuals do not have counsel and the "jail house" lawyers share information 
about seeking habeas or petitions for review. Some may file these applications in 
69. In June 2003, the ICE Office of Detention and Removal released "Endgame," its ten-year removal strat-
egy, which demonstrates the intent of the agency to increase its efforts to detain and remove aliens who 
have received a final order of removal from an IJ. The actual strategy can be found at http://www.ice/ 
gov/doclib/pi/dro/endgame.pdf (last visited Oct. 16, 2006). ICE has focused the Endgame in several 
ways, the most expansive being Operation: Compliance, a pilot program launched in Hartford, Denver, 
Atlanta, and now Miami, where ICE agents are positioned at the back of IJ courtrooms, awaiting the 
issuance of removal orders. Once those orders are issued, the agents take the unsuspecting alien into 
custody, where he or she remains pending appeal and ultimate removal. See Ricardo Alonso-Zaldivar, 
Foreigners Fighting Orders to Leave U.S. May Face jail, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 25, 2004, at A28; Alfonso 
Chardy, New Program Raises Stakes far Foreign Nationals, MIAMI HERALD, Oct. 9, 2004, at 3B. 
70. See, e.g., Gandarillas-Zambrana v. Board of Immigration Appeals, 44 F.3d 1251, 1256 (4th Cir. 1995) 
("there is nothing inherently irregular ... about the ... transfer from Virginia to Louisiana."); Sasso v. 
Milhollan, 735 F. Supp. 1045, 1047 n.6 (S.D. F1a. 1990) (describing transfer of thirty-five to forty non-
citizen felons three or four times each month from Miami to Oakdale, Louisiana or Laredo, Texas); 
Committee of Cent. Am. Refugees v. INS, 682 F. Supp. 1055, 1060 (N.D. Cal. 1988) (describing regular 
transfers from San Francisco district to El Centro, California or F1orence, Arizona); Louis v. Nelson, 544 
F. Supp. 973, 983-84 n.27 (S.D. F1a. 1982) (describing transfer of hundreds of Haitian refugees from a 
detention facility outside of Miami to remote locations across the country, including Fort Allen, Puerto 
Rico and Brooklyn, New York, and to the Bureau of Prisons's facilities in places such as Otisville and 
Raybrook, New York; Latuna and Big Springs, Texas; Lexington, Kentucky; Morgantown and Alderson, 
West Virginia). See generally Arias-Agramonte v. Comm'r of INS, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15716, *27 
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 30, 2000) ("Detained aliens are routinely transferred to facilities in other INS districts, 
often a great distance away, under the Attorney General's authority."). 
71 . The Legal Aid Society of New York provides a guide for detainees and their families and offers instruc-
tions that reflect the great distances over which detainees may be transported: 
Some facilities, such as the Global Enforcement Outsourcing facility in Q!leens, New York (for-
merly known as Wackenhut) or the Elizabeth New Jersey facility, are used exclusively for people 
seeking political asylum. Others are just for immigration detainees such as the facilities in Oak-
dale in Louisiana and Krome in F1orida. Most detainees are held in local jails that are paid a fee 
by the government for holding detainees. At this time, there is no facility for holding detainees in 
New York City. Detainees from New York are first taken to the immigration detention center at 
Varick Street in Manhattan. From Varick Street, detainees are most often sent either to Oakdale, 
Louisiana, or the Passaic County Jail in Paterson, New Jersey. 
BRIAN LoNEGAN & THE LEGAL Arn Soc'v IMMIGR. L. UNIT, IMMIGRATION DETENTION AND RE-
MOVAL: A GUIDE FOR DETAINEES AND THEIR FAMILIES 3 (2004), http://www.legal-aid.org/Uploads/ 
IMMIGRATIONDETENTIONREMOVAL.pdf;see also Samuel v. INS, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 801, 
at •12 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 20, 2005) (describing transfer from various locations in New York State to Pike 
County Jail in Pennsylvania and to an INS detention facility in Waterproof, Louisiana). 
72. Agyeman v. INS, 296 F.3d 871, 875 (9th Cir. 2002) (individual detained in Carson City, Nevada and 
transported to a detention facility in Eloy, Arizona). 
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the hope of also winning a stay of removal and others may simply not know what 
the effect of seeking judicial review may be and file because they have a belief 
that it means that someone outside the detention center and the immigration 
service will hear their cases. 73 
Helping to animate the entire field is the growth in the number of attorneys 
in the area. There has been a remarkable growth in immigration practice not 
only among those attorneys who specialize in the field, but also in the pro bono 
and non-profit services available to aid the non-citizens. In 1983, the American 
Immigration Lawyers Association ("AILA") had approximately 800 members.74 
In January of 1995, AILA had approximately 3800 members.75 In 2000, there 
were approximately 6300, and in 2005, there were over 9200 members.76 
While there are not enough pro bono attorneys or non-profit organizations 
serving the immigrant communities, there has been growth in the area. The New 
York Immigration Coalition represents approximately 150 organizations dedi-
cated to immigration law, policy and representation.77 Studies have shown that 
legal representation can actually expedite the administrative process and reduce 
litigation. 78 The growth in immigration cases in the federal courts may be at-
tributable to the larger number of attorneys or it may be that a relatively few 
number of attorneys are filing a significant number of the cases. 79 This is an 
73. See Attorney Interviews supra note 61. 
74. I joined the organization in 1984 and remember the membership numbers. 
75. AM. IMMIGR. LAWYERS Ass'N (AILA), 2005 MEMBERSHIP REPORT (on file with AILA and the New 
York Law School Law Review). 
76. Id. The numbers may be larger. It is common in law firms to have only one or two members of the firm 
pay dues in AILA while the entire firm benefits from this association's resources. Of course, some of these 
attorneys only handle business and family immigration cases and in no way participate in the litigation of 
removal cases. However, these attorneys refer cases to litigators and refer clients to other sources of support 
when they are in removal proceedings. 
77. The New York Immigration Coalition, http://www.thenyic.org/content.asp?cid:20 (last visited June 10, 
2006). 
78. See ANNA HINKIN, EXEClITIVE OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW, EVALUATION OF THE RIGHTS 
PRESENTATION, http://www.usdoj.gov/eoir/statspub/rtspresrpt.pdf (evaluating the "Know Your Rights" 
pilot program created by the Florence Immigration Project); see also Bo. OF IMMIGRATION APPEALS, 
THE BIA PRO BONO PROJECT IS SUCCESSFUL (2004), http://www.usdoj.gov/eoir/reports/BIAProBo-
noProjectEvaluation.pdf (evaluating the Pro Bono Project, which matches pro se respondents with pro 
bono attorneys); Margaret H. Taylor, Promoting Legal Representation for Detained Aliens: Litiga-
tion and Administrative Reform, 29 CONN. L. REV. 1647 (1997) (providing a thoughtful assessment of 
the value of attorneys in the administrative process). 
79. See Palmer, et al., supra note 19, at 89. The authors find that of that 87% of the petitions for review 
pending on the Second Circuit's docket on April 21, 2005 were represented by counsel. Of those petitions, 
46% were represented by just 20 law offices, with many of these offices handling over 100 petitions each. 
Id.; see also Margaret H. Taylor, Behind the Scenes ef St. Cyr and Zadvydas: Making Policy In the 
Midst ef Litigation, 16 GEO. lMMIGR. L.J. 271 (2002). 
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area where further study is needed to fully understand the motivation and strate-
gic position of the parties. 80 
V. CONGRESS TRIES TAILORING THE CUTS 
The agency is producing more raw product - the paper. The dolls have 
multiplied and are animated. The litigants are motivated to fight harder and 
longer. Moreover, Congress has passed jurisdictional statutes that fold and mul-
tiply the forms of judicial review, albeit inadvertently. While it is true that the 
bulk of the court's workload increase is from the new output of cases by the BIA, 
some portion is due to appeals from habeas petitions. But the rebirth of habeas led 
to an increase in the workload of the federal district courts as well. As I ex-
plained previously, people who were expressly prohibited from filing a petition 
for review of the administrative order of removal instead sought judicial review 
using the writ of habeas corpus. 81 Further, as the statute requires the petition for 
review to be filed within thirty days of the order of removal, 82 some non-citizens 
sought habeas review because the petition for review would have been dismissed 
as untimely. 83 It is not possible to absolutely identify how many immigration-
related habeas petitions were filed since the 1996 court stripping legislation be-
cause the Administrative Office of the United States Courts does not publish 
statistics that distinguish between the types of habeas petitions. 84 Nevertheless, it 
appears that the total volume of immigration-related habeas petitions was per-
ceived as increasing. Still, the total percentage of all immigration-related mat-
ters in the district courts was less than .2% of the total volume of all civil 
matters. 85 The government was frustrated by the habeas filings as they were 
more difficult to handle administratively through the Office of Immigration Liti-
gation, which is largely based in Washington, D.C., and local district court mat-
80. See injTa Part VI.A.2 (discussing the need for further evaluation before conclusions about the sources of 
the increase in immigration litigation can be fully developed). 
81 . See supra text accompanying note 13. 
82. See INA § 242(b)(l); 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(l) (2000). 
83. Other articles in this symposium will discuss whether habeas corpus could still be used if a petition for 
review were foreclosed. See generally Gerald L. Neuman, On the Adequacy of Direct Review After 
the REAL ID Act of 2005, 51 N.Y.L. Sett. L. REv. 133 (2006); Nancy Morawetz, Back to the Fu-
ture? Lessons Learned from Litigation over the 1996 Restrictions on judicial Review, 51 N.Y.L. 
Sett. L. REv. 113 (2006). 
84. The Administrative Office does keep statistics identifying original proceedings in the district courtS related 
to deportation cases, which I presume to be immigration-related habeas. See MECHAM, supra note 3, at 
Table C-2. A former research assistant conducted several telephone interviews with the Administrative 
Office between the spring of 2005 and the fall of 2006 during which the Administrative Office indicated 
that it could not release more detailed data. 
85. MECHAM, supra note 3, at Table C-2. This figure was arrived at by dividing the number of "deporta-
tion" actions (316) by the total number if civil actions under statutes (19,017) commenced in district courts 
in 2004. 
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ters were increasing at the same time as the enormous, explosive increases in the 
petitions for review filed in the courts of appeals. 
The lack of clear data about immigration-related habeas petitions and 
whether there was actually an increase in these filings may have contributed to 
the congressional perception that habeas filings were interfering with the orderly 
administration of the expulsion of people; it appears that courts granted relief in 
a significant number of the habeas cases. Despite procedural hurdles and the 
narrow scope of habeas review, one study showed that nearly 17% of the habeas 
petitions filed in the Southern District of New York secured some form of proce-
dural or substantive relief for the non-citizen facing removal. B6 While 17% may 
not seem like a very large number, these are the cases that at least, in theory, 
Congress sought to insulate from judicial review because Congress trusted the 
administrative process to be sufficient. 
Facing the increased volume of immigration cases, Congress once again 
picked up its shears. In May of 2005, Congress took the dramatic step of explic-
itly barring district courts from habeas corpus review of removal orders.87 On 
the surface this cut makes sense, for it appears to answer the Supreme Court 
directly in St. Cyr and other cases where the Court says that Congress has not 
explicitly indicated its unambiguous intention to preclude habeas.BB At the same 
time that Congress removed some forms of habeas, it repealed the express prohi-
bition on judicial review of deportation orders based on certain crimes.B9 In a 
sense, this cut was a restoration of jurisdiction. Further, if the statute is not 
found to be a restoration of review, the suspension of habeas may be unconstitu-
86. Rebecca Rossel, A Call for Reform: The Current State of Habeas Corpus in the Southern District of New 
York 10 (May 2005) (unpublished paper, on file with the New York Law School Review). This paper 
was prepared as part of a year-long empirical assessment of all immigration-related habeas petitions filed 
between June 25, 2001 and December 21, 2004 in the Southern District of New York. In another 
excellent honors paper, Howard Zakai prepared a pro se habeas manual examining the complex doctrinal 
issues presented in immigration habeas. His analysis was completed days before the passage of the REAL 
ID Act limitation on immigration habeas. See Howard Zakai, Habeas Corpus: A Manual for Aliens 
within the Second Circuit Seeking Review of Final Orders of Deportation (May 2005) (unpublished 
paper, on file with the New York Law School Law Review). Both of these papers illuminate some of the 
very real problems presented by the administrative adjudications and the complex set of practical hurdles 
facing many of the non-citizens such as lack of access to counsel or the harm caused by incompetent counsel. 
87. REAL ID Act of 2005, Pub. L. 109-13, 119 Stat. 231, Div. B, Title I, § 106(c) (May 11, 2005). The 
REAL ID Act creates INA§ 242(a)(5), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(5), making the courts of appeals the exclusive 
means of review, excluding habeas challenges to orders of removal. The district courts have recognized 
that "all habeas corpus petitions brought by aliens that were pending in the district courts on the date the 
REAL ID Act became effective (May 11, 2005) are to be converted to petitions for review and transferred 
to the appropriate courts of appeals." Bonhometre v. Gonzales, 414 F.3d 442, 446 (3d Cir. 2005). Dis-
trict courts have now begun the tedious task of transferring cases that have already been partially adjudi-
cated to the court of appeals for new proceedings. For an extensive discussion of the concerns of the district 
courts raised by the REAL ID Act, see Enwonwu v. Chertoff, No. 05-10511-WGY, 2005 U.S.Dist. 
LEXIS 13890 (D. Mass. July 12, 2005). 
88. See INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289 (2003); see also Neuman, supra note 83; Morawetz, supra note 83. 
89. This express prohibition was in former INA § 242(b)(l), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(l) (repealed). 
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tional. At least in theory, the petition for review should provide the adequate 
and sufficient substitute for the habeas review now precluded. 90 In other words, 
Congress recognized that some form of judicial review would continue and chose 
to limit that review to the circuit courts of appeals rather than have some litiga-
tion continue in the federal district courts. As I explain below, however, these 
changes are unlikely to result in a more efficient or limited judicial review of 
immigration cases. 
VI. ANIMATING JURISDICTION: DESIGN FOR A DYNAMIC REALITY 
This paper has established that Congress hoped to reduce the volume and 
length of judicial review of immigration removal orders and that the statutory 
means it selected were not only unsuccessful but, in combination with the other 
factors, the statutory restrictions increased the total volume of cases. Perhaps that 
critique is sufficient to convince a few observers or policy-makers that court strip-
ping is not going to reduce the amount of judicial review or even produce compli-
ant paper dolls moving in lock-step down an efficient assembly line. Yet, the 
critique does not answer what might be done to achieve the goals of efficient and 
certain methods of judicial review that would produce finality in the system 
while at the same time ensuring accuracy and fairness. 91 
David Martin provided a thoughtful assessment of the administrative pro-
cess used to assess claims of asylum. 92 At the time he wrote, the asylum system 
was growing exponentially and there was significant empirical evidence of polit-
ical and/or racial bias in the adjudication system. As part of his framing intro-
duction he noted the problem with trying to design legislation or administrative 
systems when there is a great deal of variation in the problems and people within 
the system, and government seeks to create an overarching process to handle the 
problem without recognizing the degree to which variation and complexity 
would frustrate the designer's best intentions. He quoted the analyst Walter 
Lippmann who noted that in such policy formulations the analysts tried to im-
pose their world view or perceived need and thus formulated a map or solution 
90. See Heikkila v. Barber, 345 U.S. 229, 235 (1953) (limits on judicial review are permitted, provided that 
the core of habeas review remains); see also Neuman, supra note 83; Morawetz, supra note 83. 
91 . While a just adjudication system must preserve values other than efficiency, the main focus of this paper is 
to examine those factors and dynamic interactions that frustrate the actions taken primarily as a means of 
achieving efficiency. As will be seen later, some of my reform suggestions touch on ways of reducing the 
workload of the removal system by taking some people out of it all together. Obviously another reason for 
making these suggestions beyond the goal of efficiency is the promotion of a more just or tailored immigra-
tion policy. 
92. David Martin, Reforming Asylum Atfjudication: On Navigating the Coast ef Bohemia, 138 U. PA. 
L. REV. 1247 (1990). 
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that included a sketch of the nonexistent "Coast of Bohemia."93 As Martin noted, 
the "Coast of Bohemia" problem requires patient study and design of an adjudica-
tion system with incentives that deter problems and increase the trust in the 
adjudication system. 
But even as we attempt that better design, I am haunted by the imagery of 
Lippmann - he tells us that policymakers need maps to guide them to the solu-
tions. He worries about the imperfections of the map. But assuming we avoid 
creating a map with mythical coastlines, will our system avoid the other limita-
tions of maps - their inherent lack of the experiences of dimension, context and 
reality? Map is not territory.94 
We can show members of Congress that the stripping of judicial review in 
the courts of appeals for certain classes of non-citizens led to a revival of litiga-
tion in the federal district courts. The members see that and read the case deci-
sions and respond, "Okay, strip habeas in the federal district courts and to 
forestall a constitutional attack, we'll create a narrow form of review in the 
courts of appeals." Congress may have believed they saw the territory and made 
the map - the statutory scheme - fit. The administrators of the EOIR show 
that the backlog is growing and too many panels are taking too long to issue 
individualized decisions and the administrators respond, let's find a "short cut" 
for the cases that do not present new issues and streamlined summary affirmances 
are born. 
If you have ever relied solely on a map to prepare for travel in a new place, 
you have learned that maps do not accurately reflect the experience of being in the 
place. Maps do not tell you which neighborhoods are clogged with traffic or 
whether the residents of a neighborhood welcome strangers. Maps rarely reveal 
whether you can travel between one spot and another unless there is some obvi-
ous geophysical limitation such as an ocean. It is unfortunate that Congress and 
the agency resorts to cutting process and limiting access to review rather than 
thinking through the varied forces that shape the caseload and also examining the 
interrelationship of those forces. You simply can't solve this problem by conceiv-
ing it as a piece of paper that can be folded and cut. While the litigants attacking 
the agency decisions may bear some responsibility for using the judicial review 
process in cases where delay is the essential goal, the attorneys and self-repre-
93. WALTER LIPPMANN, PuBLIC OPINION 27 (1922), available at http://xroads.virginia.edu/-Hyper2/ 
CDFinal/Lippman/cover.html. The Bohemia coast makes an appearance in William Shakespeare's A 
Winter's Tale, Act III, scene iii. 
94. JONATHAN z. SMITH, MAP IS NoTTERR!TORY: STUDIES IN THE HISTORY OF RELIGION (1978) (quoting 
ALFRED KORZYBSKI, SCIENCE AND SANITY 58 (1958)); see also Lenni B. Benson, Breaking Bureau-
cratic Borders: A Necessary Step Towards Immigration Law Refbrm, 54 ADMIN. L. REv. 203 (2002) 
(providing a lengthy exploration of this concept and a warning that policy makers should live the experi-
ence of the territory before trying to formulate a plan based on a statute or "map" alone). 
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sented non-citizens may have had few immediate choices given the lengthy, if not 
permanent, barriers to return. 95 
Congress and policy analysts need to see the animated people in the process 
and reflect on the incentives to seek judicial review. I do not have a detailed map 
or topographical plan to set the proper boundaries because the exact nature and 
extent of the problems are not yet understood. However, I would urge Congress, 
the courts and the agencies to focus on a framework that evaluates the incentives, 
the remedies, and the adaptability of the system. In this final section of the arti-
cle, I suggest some ways to improve the entire adjudication process. Some of the 
reforms focus on the quality of the process and others on the substantive issues 
that create incentives to fight or litigate. While some of the suggestions below 
may appear to be aimed at reforming substantive immigration law, my goal is to 
illustrate that the system designers must understand the dynamics of the immi-
gration law. Whether the goal of the system is increased efficiency or prioritizing 
thorough case-by-case adjudication, the system design must anticipate how adju-
dication interacts with the larger immigration context. 
A. Enhance the Process 
1. Recognize the Value ef Thorough and Fair Acfjudications to 
the Process. 
Under current case law, due process may not require review by an Article 
III court. 96 Setting aside the possibility of an Article I tribunal, the current path 
95. If appeals are frivolous both the BIA and the courts of appeals have the ability to address that problem 
directly via existing rules and sanctions. But based on some of the reversal rates found in limited empiri-
cal studies, I do not believe that the main source of this problem is people mounting frivolous challenges. 
The rate or remand or reversal in the Second Circuit is 20%, and has reached as high as 40% in the 
Seventh Circuit. See Immigration Litigation Reduction: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 
109th Cong. (2006) (statement of John M. Walker, Jr., Chief Judge, United States Court of Appeals for 
the Second Circuit); Letter from Richard A. Posner, Circuit Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the 
Seventh Circuit, to Richard ]. Durbin, United States Senator (Mar. 15, 2006) (citing Benslimane v. 
Gonzales, 430 F.3d 828 (7th Cir. 2005) (on file with author)); see, e.g., Rossel, supra note 86, at 10 
(finding a 17% rate of remand to the agency in habeas cases). 
96. The Supreme Court has never held that the separation of powers doctrine requires some judicial review of 
administrative immigration adjudication to be conducted in an independent Article III court. It is beyond 
the scope of this article to discuss whether an Article I court might provide an appropriate forum. There 
are several excellent articles on discussing the merits of an Article I court. See, e.g., Maurice A. Roberts, 
The Board of Immigration Appeals: A Critical Appraisal, 15 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 29 (1977); Maurice 
A. Roberts, Proposed: A Special Statutory Immigration Court 18 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 1 (1980); Rob-
ert E. Juceam & Stephen Jacobs, Constitutional and Policy Considerations of an Article I Immigra-
tion Court, 18 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 29 (1980); Stephen H. Legomsky, Forum Choices far the Review 
of Agency Atfjudication: A Study of the Immigration Process, 71 IowA L. REv. 1297 (1986) (based 
on a Administrative Conference of the United States ("ACUS") study identifying value of judicial review 
to both agency and those regulated); see also, Ella Goldenberg, A Special Proposal: A Specialized Article 
III Immigration Court (Spring 2005) (unpublished paper, on file with the New York Law School Law 
Review); Holly Higgins, Independent study comparing Article I and Article III specialized courts (Spring 
2005) (unpublished paper, on file with the New York Law School Law Review). 
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of the EOIR destroys trust in the system. Too many of the decisions reveal an 
agency that is non-responsive, prone to error, and lack too many of the basic 
hallmarks of fair forum adjudication.97 The entire EOIR process should be ex-
amined with the goal of increasing professionalism and improving the BIA's 
ability to adapt to the workload before it. 
Critics of the BIA have focused both on the poor quality of the decisions and 
also on the people selected to be the decision-makers. Although the Department of 
Justice indicated that one of the factors that would be used for evaluating the 
quality of Board members would be broad experience in immigration and admin-
istrative law, as well as comprehensive knowledge of the field of immigration 
laws,98 the government has instead continued to staff the board with members 
with extensive law enforcement and prosecutorial experience rather than a more 
varied range of expertise.99 An ABA study also found that members whose opin-
ions have proved to be too progressive or pro-alien have been removed or have 
retired with little explanation.100 
It is no stretch of the imagination to assume that a combination of inexperi-
ence in a specialized field like immigration law and an emphasis on prosecution 
and law enforcement have been partially to blame for the adverse results of BIA 
decision-making. To foster trust in the administrative system, Congress must 
first improve the quality of the main decision-making agency. Congress could 
either create experience requirements or create an independent board that would 
recommend nominations of both IJs and BIA Members to the administration.101 
Certainly, Congress must agree that the BIA does not meet the goals of an effi-
cient removal system when a record number of its decisions are being challenged 
9 7. One student study calculated that the BIA was producing a remarkable number of cases after it reduced its 
membership from 23 to 11. Goldenberg, supra note 96, at 7 & n.24 ("These eleven members reviewed a 
total of 41,907 cases in 2003, or approximately 114 cases per day if the members work 365 days a year or 
4.75 cases per hour if they work 24 hours a day." She based these estimates on the workload report 
produced by EOIR. The report was once published on the EOIR website (http://www.usdoj.gov/eoir/ 
statspub/fy03syb.pdf (last visited September 11, 2005)), but is no longer available at that address. Simi-
lar data can be found in the EOIR Statistical Yearbook, available at http://www.usdoj.gov/eoirlstatspub/ 
syb2000.main.htm (last visited Oct. 16, 2006). 
98. DORSEY & WHITNEY, LLP, supra note 19, at 11. 
99. Id. at 12. This report further informs that in 2001, the EOIR appointed three members to the BIA who 
had accumulated a combined six decades of service within the Department of Justice Criminal Division, 
but had no prior immigration law experience or background. 
100. See id. 
l 0 l. Sarah Kroll-Rosenbaum, Immigration Review Agency and Judicial Efficiency Act of 2005: A Legislative 
Model for Establishing and Improving a Fair and Efficient Process of Judicial Review of Orders of 
Removal, 10-22 (Spring 2005) (unpublished paper, on file with the New York Law School Law Review) 
(includes text of proposed legislation and a proposal for reform of the BIA). 
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in the courts and a high number are remanded either by stipulation or formal 
court order.102 
EOIR reforms must go further than trying to put the best adjudicators into 
the system. The agency needs better funding and increased support to accomplish 
the large adjudication task before it. Putting pressure on the individual IJs to 
hear cases too quickly or simply to move a docket along too often results in simply 
moving problems onto the BIA and then to the courts. While there will still be 
those who seek judicial review of administrative orders, the increased quality of 
the orders will gradually help the body of law to develop more clearly and will 
allow reviewing courts to avoid remands for clarification of findings. 
The courts of appeals have grown increasingly frustrated not only by the 
increase in appeals, but with the failure of the BIA to recognize mistakes in IJ 
decisions. The result of this frustration has been, in some cases, for the courts to 
generate complex jurisdictional questions from simple factual disputes.103 In a 
recent memorandum to IJs within the Department of Justice, Attorney General 
Alberto Gonzales echoed the frustration of the courts of appeals.104 In his memo 
the Attorney General criticized the work of many of the Department's IJs as 
"intemperate or even abusive" and failing to "produce the quality of work that I 
expect from employees of [the Department]."1os 
The BIA may need internal institutional reforms to re-train particular IJs 
or to provide more support so that an IJ does not have to issue a decision without 
time for reflection. In his memorandum, the Attorney General announced that 
the Deputy and Associate Attorneys General would conduct a "comprehensive 
review" of the immigration courts. It is unclear whether this review will address 
the more glaring problems addressed in this article. Administrative rules might 
be adopted to require more detailed citation to the hearing record. As the current 
procedures are to use tape recordings, rather than typed transcripts, the EOIR 
might evaluate whether in some contested cases it is wiser to use standard court 
reporter transcription. As technology improves and may one day provide accu-
rate written transcriptions to be produced from audio recordings, the EOIR 
should consider adopting these improvements. Today, speech software would al-
low an IJ to dictate the decisions while a fairly accurate transcription is pro-
duced.106 At a minimum, the procedures ought to be modified to require an IJ to 
102. See CoMM. ON FEo. COURTS, Ass'N OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF N.Y., supra note 32, at 11-12 
(discussing experience in the Second Circuit Court of Appeals and noting a high rate of disposition by 
settlement which included agreement to remand). 
103. See, e.g., supra note 58 and accompanying text. 
104. See Memorandum, supra note 65. 
105. Id. 
106. "Dragon Naturally Speaking," produced by Nuance Communications, Inc., is an example of voice recogni-
tion software. See Nuance Communications Home Page,http://www.nuance.com (last visited June 28, 
2006). This software was recently reviewed in the The New York Times. See David Pogue, Like 
Having a Secretary in Your PC, N.Y. TIMES, July 20, 2006, at CL Even without training the program 
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review a typed transcription of all decisions for accuracy. The time needed to 
produce the transcription would also create time for reflection, allowing the IJ to 
test his or her decision for persuasiveness and logical consistency, as well as to 
provide an opportunity for correction and augmentation. 
A rather simple solution may be to increase the number of law clerks sup-
porting the IJs. Judge Michael Daly Hawkins of the Ninth Circuit Court of 
Appeals said that some courts have one law clerk for every ten judges.107 This 
modest investment in personnel might make a significant difference in identify-
ing gaps and errors in the administrative process. 
Even in the small percentage of cases where the BIA does issue a written 
opinion, the opinions often contain a lack of substantive legal reasoning. These 
appellate administrative decisions are important both for the particular case and 
also for the guidance the decisions provide to the individual hearing officers. If 
the decisions do not fully develop lines of legal argument and explain the underly-
ing legal rationales, they can undermine efficiency by leaving unintended issues 
open for future litigation. In some cases, insufficient legal reasoning may result 
in reversal by the courts of appeals or unnecessary splits in the circuit courts that 
dispute the rationales underlying the BIA decisions. 
The EOIR should also establish internal database systems which allow indi-
vidual staff attorneys at the BIA and the BIA members themselves to track the 
subsequent history of each decision. The same reporting should be given to indi-
vidual IJs. Taking time to recognize the patterns of reversal and the remands on 
recommendation of the government would give the members of the EOIR con-
crete guidance in improving its performance.108 
2. Recognize the Value ef judicial Review to the Process. 
Better review, both at the administrative level and in the federal courts, 
enhances the quality of our legal system and aids the agency officials administer-
ing the law.109 The dialogue generated in the review process is one of our legal 
system's methods of identifying problems in the law. Through judicial review, 
we find the areas where statutory reform is needed, where the system is being 
to fit a speaker's diction, the software creates a document that is 98.9% accurate. Recently, Adam David-
son, a correspondent for NPR, reviewed the software. While he seemed to be quite impressed by its 
accuracy, he discovered that the software does not work when more than one voice speaks. Morning 
Edition: Dictation Software Improves Usability, Accuracy (NPR radio broadcast July 24, 2006), 
available at http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyld=5577523. Therefore, it seems that 
until further development, this software is unable to transcribe hearings. 
l 07. Pamela A. MacLean, Judges Blast Immigration Rulings: Cases Rushed Through Review Process 
Result in Erroneous Asylum Denials, Flood Circuits, NATL L. ]., Oct. 24, 2005, at Sl. 
l 08. See supra note 58; see also COMM. ON FED. CouRTS, Ass'N OF THE BAR OF THE CrTY OF N.Y., supra 
note 32. 
l 09. See Legomsky, supra note 96. 
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resisted by large groups of people and where justice may not be served by archaic 
rules or overly restrictive statutory provisions. 
The ideal forum for judicial review needs to be further evaluated.110 Immi-
gration cases perhaps should be shifted back to the federal district courts in order 
to spread the workload among a larger number of judges. Appeals beyond the 
district court level might be limited to the discretion of the deciding judge.111 
Congress might alternatively authorize special panels within the courts of ap-
peals to hear these cases after development of the administrative record. Another 
mechanism might be to allow consolidation of cases by a specialized tribunal to 
allow efficient resolution of large problems similar to a class action model. 
While some in Congress have suggested a single, specialized Article III court 
for handling the review of EOIR decisions, specialized courts present their own 
problems and cannot necessarily handle the volume of cases.112 Whether such a 
specialized court would solve the workload issue of the federal courts deserves 
greater study; however, as this paper has demonstrated, it is not merely the na-
ture of the federal court that contributes to the amount and quality of judicial 
review, but rather it is the interaction of the role of the court with the adminis-
trative adjudication process and the motivations of the litigants. 
B. Establish Reasonable Incentives 
1. Incentives to Comply With Immigration Laws. 
Under our current statutory scheme, "would-be immigrants" can fall into 
legal exiles very easily. The bars are complex and not easy to explain. Some 
affect those who are newly arrived, some subject even life-long residents to the 
threat of removal. So long as people do not naturalize, they remain subject to the 
grounds of deportation. As this paper has mentioned, in some cases even minor 
criminal conduct can subject a person to the threat of permanent removal. It is 
completely understandable that people who have spent the majority of their lives 
in the United States would resist leaving. Using our immigration laws as a 
form of civil punishment is a policy that deserves closer scrutiny and evaluation 
of the consequences not only for the person removed but for their families in the 
United States.113 While I could describe several of the legal exiles, I have selected 
11 0. Stephen Legomsky and David Martin have both written excellent papers evaluating many of these issues. 
See Legomsky, supra note 96; Martin, supra note 92. It is unfortunate that ACUS no longer exists for 
both of those papers were based on studies requested by ACUS. 
111. See Kroll-Rosenbaum, supra note 101; if. 28 U.S.C. § 1292b (providing for permission to appeal an 
interlocutory decision). 
112. An example of a specialized Article III court is the Federal Court of International Trade. Others might 
suggest that an Article I court is sufficient; however, given the importance of the rights at stake, delega-
tion of all removal power to the political branches would raise serious constitutional issues. See sources 
cited supra note 96. 
11 3. Another crucial bar is the ten-year bar that is triggered if a non-citizen fails to depart after an order of 
voluntary departure. There is a split in the circuit courts over whether judicial review tolls the deadline. 
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the most common barrier as an illustration 
created in 1996. 
VOLUME 51 I 2006/07 
the bars for unlawful presence 
Once an individual has acquired more than 180 days of unlawful presence 
in the United States, he or she faces a three-year bar on returning but that bar is 
only triggered if he or she departs the United States. This odd incentive to re-
main in the United States after unlawfully entering or overstaying a lawful 
entry only gets worse because the penalty increases to a ten-year bar once someone 
has a more than one year of unlawful presence. Frequently people who initially 
entered the United States know nothing of these long-term consequences and it is 
only after they have established employment or personal relationships that would 
traditionally authorize immigration to the United States do they find out they 
are trapped in "illegal" status. While Congress initially created these bars in the 
1996 legislation to create an incentive for individuals to avoid overstaying and 
to punish repeat illegal entry, there is no official notice of these barriers and many 
people fall into the trap unwittingly. 114 Moreover, in the past Congress has 
authorized at least two short term waivers of the bars where individuals could 
acquire sponsorship and pay a substantial fine. This pattern of imposing a tough 
absolute limit followed by relaxing the barrier through temporary forgiveness has 
only increased the confusion among the immigrant communities and their legal 
advisors. The short term waivers were not universally available and resulted in 
situations where similarly situated people had dramatically different outcomes. A 
person who could find a sponsor before April of 2001 is forgiven illegal entry, a 
person who did not or who entered after April finds no forgiveness. These com-
plex waivers, and I have not fully described the complexity of it here, create a 
perception among many non-citizens that they can access these exceptions if they 
have a clever lawyer or if they simply wait long enough for Congress to act. As 
this article goes to press, Congress is once again considering a range of legaliza-
tion programs that might forgive past violations of status.115 
If Congress would more carefully tailor its use of deportation and consider 
more generous exceptions or waivers, it is likely that many of the people now 
litigating fiercely would either not be in the removal system or would have the 
Compare Ramsay v. INS, 14 F.3d 206 (4th Cir. 1994) (holding that voluntary departure period may be 
tolled) with Casteneda v. INS, 23 F.3d 1576 (10th Cir. 1994) (courts have no authority to extend depar-
ture period). See also Chelsea Walsh, Note: Voluntary Departure Stopping the Clock far Judicial 
Review, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 2857 (2005). The First Circuit recently revisited this issue and overruled 
its prior holding that it had the authority to extend the departure period, perhaps signaling a trend away 
from tolling. Bocova v. Gonzales, 412 F.3d 257 (1st Cir. 2005). This is an important example of where 
an incentive to comply with a final order may not have been sufficiently developed by Congress. See also 
American Immigration Law Foundation's Legal Action Center, Practice Advisory: Staying the Voluntary 
Departure Period When Filing a Motion to Reopen or Reconsider (Dec. 16, 2005), available at http:// 
www.ailf.org/lac/lac_pa_121605. pdf. 
114. At a minimum, the DHS might consider providing new entrants with a written warning. This warning 
might be incorporated in the admission documents issued to most non-citizens entering the United States. 
115. See, e.g., Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act, S. 2611, 109th Cong. § 2 (2006). 
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opportunity for fair treatment at the administrative levels. When we make the 
forgiveness boundaries too small, people will litigate about the boundaries of the 
net or the box. Of course, the administration could be part of the solution of this 
issue immediately. The DHS is notorious, as it was when it was part of the 
Department of Justice, for failing to exercise prosecutorial discretion. Rather 
than carefully selecting which cases should be in removal proceedings, the agencies 
continue to prosecute all cases notwithstanding the fact that Congress has re-
stricted the forms of discretionary relief. 
In those cases where discretion is possible, where individual adjudication is 
necessary to determining eligibility for forgiveness, it is essential to have an adju-
dication system that acts with consistency and professionalism. Unfortunately, 
the current system does not prioritize the adjudication of even the few existing 
waivers after deportation, and the process is lengthy and uncertain.116 Predict-
ing eligibility for forgiveness is nearly impossible. Perhaps Congress should con-
sider delegating these discretionary decisions to a division of the DHS that 
resolves benefits rather than to those who enforce the removal statutes. On the 
other hand, restoring greater discretion to the IJs and EOIR may also increase 
the quantity of litigation before the agency. A way to avoid increased litigation 
would be to reduce the breadth and scope of the grounds of deportability rather 
than relying on waivers to alleviate the harshness of the removal statutes. For 
example, creating a statute of limitations for long-term residents would generate 
broad exemptions from removal grounds, eliminating the need for both litigation 
and reliance waivers. 
2. Reduce the Incentive to Fight by Creating Forms of Relief 
from Removal 
When an individual is placed in removal proceedings and learns that he or 
she has no legal basis to remain in the United States, the obvious incentive is to 
evade the entire proceeding and to live underground. This is why so many of the 
orders are issued in absentia and one reason why the government has increased 
the use of detention to ensure attendance at the removal proceedings. Congress 
tried to counterbalance the incentive to avoid the removal hearing by providing 
harsh consequences for those who receive an in absentia order. If an individual 
possesses the skills and qualities that make him or her eligible for immigration 
through our employment system or have the close relatives that qualify the indi-
vidual for immigration through the family system, does it make sense to subject 
him or her to a permanent bar upon departure, or should the bar be one that 
could be waived in appropriate equitable circumstances? Alternatively, the bar 
116. To prove this assertion is difficult, for there is no transparent published information available about the 
government processing waivers. The government websites contain only limited information and most 
people would need an attorney to learn about the possibility of a waiver. See infta sources cited in note 
123. 
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might be reduced to a shorter period of penance or punishment. A ten-year bar is 
simply one that creates the wrong incentive. People with strong ties to this coun-
try will be unwilling to face that punishment.117 Further, if the underlying pol-
icy is to incentivize immigration law compliance, these bars have not been 
successful. 
For those individuals who are subject to a final order not obtained in an in 
absentia proceeding, statutes similarly bar them from reentry for at least ten 
years and that bar increases to twenty years {or those who have been removed at 
least once before.118 For those people removed due to a conviction for an aggra-
vated felony, the bar is permanent. 119 If the individual has the ability to use the 
legal immigration system to reenter the United States after removal through a 
non-immigrant or immigrant visa, the statutes authorize a very limited 
waiver; 120 it is available only to those who obtain the consent of the Attorney 
General to the person's readmission.121 This waiver is actually adjudicated by a 
special unit of the DHS.122 An individual who wants to obtain this waiver 
must wait abroad for this exercise of discretion. For some, the risk that the 
waiver will be denied must be weighed against the incentive to prolong their 
presence in the United States. One possible way to increase compliance with 
removal orders is to limit the waiver to those who comply within a certain time 
period of the finality of the order of removal. Another approach might be to 
make the results in past waiver applications more transparent. At the current 
time, the decisions on the waivers are rarely reported. The major treatise in the 
field only reports on a handful of such cases.123 In the past, the agency has also 
117. See Singh v. INS, 295 F.3d 1037, 1039-40 (9th Cir. 2002) (discussing the reasons someone would not 
appear and pointing out that the petitioner should not be seen as someone merely absconding); see also 
Lory Diana Rosenberg, Gonna Need Somebody on Your Bond: Pre-Removal Detention Under the 
INA, 8 BENDER'S IMMIGR. BULL. 1409 (2003). 
11 8. INA§ 212(a)(9)(A)(ii), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(A)(ii). 
119. Id. 
120. This waiver is called the 1-212 waiver after the form used to make the application. 
121. INA § 212(a)(9)(A)(iii), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(A)(iii). 
1 2 2. The implementing regulations for this provision delegate the authority to adjudicate these waivers to 
"[o]fficers in charge of overseas offices." 8 C.F.R. § 207.3(a) (2006). 
123. See CHARLES GORDON, STANLEY MAILMAN, & STEPHEN YALE-LOEHR, 5-63 IMMIGR. LAW& PROCE-
DURE § 63.10(4)(b) n.115. Interestingly this footnote reports only decisions where the waiver was 
granted. While the CIS now publishes some of the appeals of the denial of the permission to reapply, I 
reviewed the five posted decisions for the year 2004 and all of the cases concerned appeals that sustained 
the denial of the waiver. I then reviewed several years' worth of posted decisions and found only one 
remand. I recently came across one unpublished, redacted opinion from December 5, 2005, where an 
appeal was sustained and an application to reapply was granted. There, an IJ had failed to take into 
account a Fifth Circuit finding that a DWI conviction failed to serve as an aggravated felony. The IJ had 
relied solely on the conviction and failed to weigh the applicant's seventeen-year marriage to a U.S. 
citizen and his eleven-year legal residency in the United States without so much as a speeding ticket. It is 
unclear why the librarians who are responsible for the postings did not post any cases where the decision to 
deny a waiver was reversed but the absence of reversals suggests that it is difficult for members of the 
67 
MAKING PAPER DOLLS 
used a preapproval mechanism to allow certain people to depart with the ap-
proved waiver already issued. 124 
I must acknowledge that forms of relief also create incentives to litigate. 
The statistical analysis prepared by John Palmer, Elizabeth Cronin and Stephen 
Yale-Loehr indicates that a very significant percentage of the cases currently 
pending in the Second Circuit Court of Appeals are petitions seeking review of a 
denial of asylum.125 This evidence at first blush appears to suggest that the 
availability of this relief leads to litigation, and that if there was not such relief 
available, these cases would not be in court. It is hard to generalize about which 
forms of relief will mitigate or increase litigation workloads. Providing reasona-
ble and realistic opportunities for a person who has been found deportable to 
legally immigrate in the future will create an incentive for that person to "step in 
line" with the administrative procedures and stop litigating about the 
boundaries. 
3. Understand ]udt"cial Stays of Removal and the Effect of 
Removal 
It is not uncommon for opponents of judicial review to argue that non-
citizens only seek judicial review of an order of removal in an effort to delay or 
frustrate execution of the order. Congress addressed this concern in the 1996 
legislative reforms when it removed the automatic stay provisions that accompa-
nied petitions for review and shortened the time period for seeking review from 
six months to thirty days.126 Previously, the statute had created an automatic 
stay of removal upon the filing of a petition for review and further, the statute 
expressly stated that removal would cancel jurisdiction.127 Today, filing a peti-
tion for review does not automatically generate a stay of removal. A review of 
public or the bar to know what criteria the agency seeks before granting such a waiver. For administra-
tive decisions see Decisions Issued in 2005 - Code H4, http://www.uscis.gov/graphics/lawsregs/ad-
mindec3/h4/2005/index.htm (last visited Aug. 10, 2006). 
124. See Gordon, Mailman, Yale-Loehr, supra note 123, at § 74.03 (discussing the defunct process of ad-
vanced arrangements for immigrant visas by aliens present in the United States). 
12 5. Palmer, et al., supra note 19. 
126. INA § 242(b)(l), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(B)(l) (2000). The statute does not expressly state that jurisdiction 
continues after removal but that is the implicit result based on the repeal of the prior statutory provision 
that terminated jurisdiction. A number of courts have addressed this specific issue. See, e.g., Rife v. 
Ashcroft, 374 F.3d 606, 615 (8th Cir. 2004) (explaining that "an alien's removal does not moot his or her 
petition for judicial review"); U.S. v. Garcia-Echavarria, 374 F.3d 440, 447 (6th Cir. 2004) (explaining 
that "an alien's removal while his petition for review is pending neither deprives the court of appeals of 
jurisdiction over that petition nor does it necessarily render moot the claims in that petition"). 
127. INA§ 106(a)(3), 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(a)(3) (1994) (repealed by Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act 
of 1997, Pub. L. No. 104-208, Div. C, Title III, § 306(b), 110 Stat. 3009-612 (1996)). There were a 
few exceptions to the rule that removal ended the court's jurisdiction. For example, the Ninth Circuit 
Court of Appeals had ruled that the government must bring respondents back to the United States if their 
removal was in violation of a stay order or achieved in a manner that denied the respondent an opportu-
nity to appeal. Mendez v. INS, 563 F.2d 956, 958 (9th Cir. 1977). 
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the practice in the circuits indicates that by and large the courts of appeals do 
grant stays when the petitioner makes a proper showing.128 If it is true that a 
stay of removal is a primary incentive to seek review, Congress and the courts 
could address the issue of the stay more directly. For example, the courts might 
require that the application for a stay clearly articulate the legal errors and an 
argument of why the respondent is likely to prevail. Some blanket lines might be 
drawn, such as stays would be available only to those people who are contesting 
removability itself or have sought a form of relief other than voluntary 
departure. 
Currently, the BIA regulations use the opposite approach. Once the indi-
vidual has departed the country or has been removed by the government, the BIA 
holds that its jurisdiction ends. Those respondents who wish to file a motion to 
reopen because new relief has become available or a motion to reconsider based on 
a change in the law must seek judicial review in an effort to preserve their 
ability to pursue these administrative remedies. In general, these motions are to 
be filed within ninety days of the final order.129 A change in the BIA regulations 
allowing motions to reopen and reconsider to be heard within a reasonable period 
of time after removal would decrease the incentive to seek judicial review solely 
as a method of delaying removal. The appeal of the motion to reopen/reconsider 
could be combined with the appeal of the underlying order of removal.130 
128. In a study of the practice in the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, the government took the position that no 
removal order would be processed when the petition for review was pending. This step was apparently 
taken to reduce the burden on the government attorneys handling the stay requests. While this is an 
understandable position of the government, it does of course create an incentive by the litigants to file a 
petition for review knowing that it will in essence produce the effect of a formal stay. See CoMM. ON 
FED. CouRTS, Ass'N OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF N.Y., supra note 32, at 11. 
129. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.23. There are a few necessary exceptions to this time limit such as setting aside an in 
absentia order where the respondent did not receive notice of the removal proceeding. There is no time 
limit where the person did not receive notice as that would create a due process violation. See Andia v. 
Ashcroft, 359 F.3d 1181 (9th Cir. 2004). There is also an exception to the strict time limit if the govern-
ment joins in the motion. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.23(b)(4)(iv). The period is extended to 180 days where the 
respondent can establish exceptional circumstances. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.23(b)(4)(ii). There is no systematic 
reporting of when the government will join in a joint motion to reopen but the anecdotal evidence -
based on interviews with trial attorneys and reading postings on attorney list-servs discussing the criteria 
judges use to grant such motions - is that the government attorneys will sometimes join these motions 
where an individual has become eligible for legal immigration, usually because of marriage to a U.S. 
citizen, and is not otherwise removable as a person convicted of a crime. 
1 30. The current statute ineffectually suggests that appeals from motions to reopen/reconsider should be com-
bined with the underlying review of the final order of removal but in reality the timing required to 
complete administrative review of the motion to reopen or reconsider does not allow for combining judicial 
review of both aspects of the case. See INA§ 242(d), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d). While the current regulations 
require a motion to reopen within 180 days of the final order, the government should consider extending 
this period to one year or more given the costs and disruptions of removal and the increased complexity of 
preparing such a request from abroad. Moreover, any time limit should have exceptions where the re-
spondent can demonstrate country conditions that frustrated or prevented the application. See Stone v. 
INS, 514 U.S. 386, 394 (1995) (holding that filing a motion to reopen or reconsider does not toll original 
time period to seek petition for review); Patel v. Ashcroft, 123 F. App'x 72, 74 (3d Cir. 2005) (explaining 
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Another question that arises as a result of actual removal is what is the 
remedy if the respondent actually prevails in his or her appeal? Does the U.S. 
government bear the costs of returning the individual to the U.S.? There are no 
statutory or regulatory provisions addressing this issue. Certainly attorneys 
counseling clients about the consequences of removal cannot promise their clients 
that the government will issue documents necessary for their return. If our goal 
is to create incentives to comply with removal orders, we need to address this 
great area of uncertainty and give statutory rights and methods of enforcement 
where the government has erroneously removed an individual. The government 
is also notoriously slow in issuing a variety of travel documents.131 Ideally, the 
statute would specify a period when the government must issue these documents 
and provide authority to the Department of State to issue a travel document if 
the Department of Homeland Security has failed to act within the deadline. 
C. Study the Dynamics in the System 
I have argued that the workload of the federal courts is not directly in the 
control of Congress or of any single participant in the adjudication system. Still, 
Congress and the federal courts are undoubtedly motivated to do something about 
a category of cases that are coming to dominate the federal docket. Congress can-
not really begin to address the issues until it acquires more information. Congress 
and the agencies both should recruit excellent "cartographers" and "ethnologists." 
We need people to study the context of the problems and to reflect on the incen-
tives of varied participants. For example, the Office of Immigration Litigation 
("OIL") is a very skilled group of attorneys within the Civil Division of the 
Department of Justice ("DO]") responsible for the primary defense of the BIA in 
federal court. While these attorneys have a wealth of information about the types 
of cases being litigated and the decisions of the BIA, they may not be open minded 
to a proposal that opposes centralization of judicial review.132 Based in Wash-
ington, D.C., OIL may view the most efficient solution as a single federal court 
situated in the District of Columbia. Attorneys representing the non-citizens in 
proceedings may prefer the existing standards for the issuance of stays of removal 
rather than a system which enforces final orders more rapidly but preserves judi-
cial review. The goals and values of the EOIR and the agency enforcing the 
removal orders also need to be carefully evaluated before accepting assertions that 
that while the court can hear a petition for review denying a motion to reopen or reconsider an in 
absentia order, the court cannot consider any challenge to the underlying order.) 
1 31 . Statement of Paul K. Martin, Deputy Inspector General, U.S. Department of Justice. Committee on 
House Judiciary, Subcommittee on Immigration, Border Security, and Claims (Mar. 10, 2005). 
132. There is also a special civil division located within the U.S. Attorneys Office for the Southern District of 
New York. To my knowledge this is the only office outside ofWashington D.C that has a group dedicated 
to immigration litigation. As of May 2006, OIL was asserting main responsibility for these cases. The 
workload of OIL has grown so rapidly that Assistant U.S. Attorneys all over the country have been 
assigned to immigration appeals. Interview with Patricia Buchanan, AUSA, S.D.N.Y. (April 2006). 
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existing procedures are sufficient or adequately protect individualized decision-
making. 
There are many serious empirical questions. Does the bifurcated agency di-
vided between DHS and DOJ contribute to the administrative efficiencies? In 
what way? ICE Attorneys are separate from the DOJ and housed within the 
DHS. Is this the most efficient structure? If the DOJ attorneys in OIL ulti-
mately must defend the administration in the federal courts, are the lessons 
learned in the litigation communicated through the channels of OIL to the attor-
neys within ICE? To develop the proper culture of prosecutorial discretion, coor-
dination of prosecutorial priorities is essential. 
In what way is the behavior of the immigration bar driving the increase in 
the workload? Are too many appeals frivolous? Do the current statutory 
prohibitions on frivolous appeals mean that the agency and the courts are reluc-
tant to ever label an appeal frivolous because the sanction to the non-citizen is a 
permanent bar on relief under the immigration laws?133 In conducting my re-
search for this article I learned that at least one attorney has been sanctioned for 
his failure to file briefs and for failure to adequately prepare the appellate 
briefs.134 While it is time-consuming for the circuit courts of appeal to bring such 
sanctions, it does seem like the wiser approach to deter the behavior of attorneys 
who may be inadequately representing the non-citizens or may be inappropri-
ately filing petitions for review that have no reasonable basis in law. Certainly, 
the approach of sanctioning attorneys who abuse this system is preferable to blan-
ket rules that try to constrain advocacy for an entire class of cases or that sanction 
the non-citizen asylum applicant who may not even be aware of the nature of his 
or her counsel's behavior. 
Similarly, the courts might more frequently consider an award of fees under 
the Equal Access to Justice Act. This Act authorizes attorney's fees where the 
government's position was not reasonably supported and the petitioner 
prevailed. 135 
While Congress might assign some of the study to the Government Account-
ability Office or convene a select committee or an independent commission, there 
are other institutional actors who can assist in evaluating these issues. For ex-
ample, the Federal Judicial Center's Research Division provides studies on the 
trends in federal judicial case management as well as training and education for 
l 3 3. If the agency or court finds a claim frivolous it can bar the non-citizen from all future relief under the 
immigration laws. INA§ 208(d)(6) renders a noncitizen who "has knowingly made a frivolous applica-
tion for asylum," and who has received proper notice, "permanently ineligible for any benefits" under the 
INA. INA § 208(d)(6), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(d)(6). 
l 34. After a hearing, the Second Circuit assigned a Special Master to monitor the conduct of the attorney. See 
Court of Appeals Docket No. 03-4640 (2d Cir. 2005). 
135. See supra note 64 (discussing Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2412). 
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attorneys in complex practices.136 The ABA commissioned study conducted by 
Dorsey & Whitney, LLP demonstrates the type of study that can be completed on 
complex issues of immigration law.137 Private research institutions reflecting a 
range of political opinions such as the Migration Policy Institute, the Brookings 
and Cato Institutes, the RAND Corporation, the Institute for Policy Studies, 
Center for Migration Studies, the American Immigration Lawyers Foundation's 
Immigration Policy Center and the National Center for Policy Analysis, conduct 
independent studies that focus on many of these issues. The issues are too great 
and too complex to be allowed to legislate in a vacuum.138 
VII. CONCLUSION 
This article has suggested that the empirical reality of the congressional at-
tempts to reduce federal court review of administrative immigration orders com-
bined with the judicial and administrative response to congressional pressure 
have perversely increased the amount and complexity of judicial review. The 
real goal of this essay is not to prove an empirical assertion but rather to capture 
the dynamic of our governmental adjudication of immigration cases. 
Immigration cases are fundamentally about people. Law can attempt to 
control and limit the behavior of people but where those laws are disconnected 
from the reality of people's lives or where the law devalues the ties people have in 
the United States, any attempt to "control" people via the mechanism of immi-
gration law is frankly, a doomed mission. People are not paper, easily manipu-
lated, folded and reduced for convenience. 
If Congress truly wants to achieve an efficient and cost effective mechanism 
to decide who remains and who should be removed, it must first acknowledge 
that summary solutions, sweeping categories and blanket denials will not achieve 
their goal. Reforms that acknowledge this and create incentives for individual 
non-citizens and their counsel to cooperate will help reduce the workload of the 
adjudication system. Reforms that people recognize as comporting with fairness 
will help courts and the agencies enforce against those who have neither insuffi-
cient equities nor serious legal claims. 
The hard work for the legislative branch should be the designing of a system 
of incentives and tailored justice - justice that is designed to ensure individual 
treatment rather than a system which is so rigid that inequities abound. Admit-
136. For a list of some of the current studies maintained by the Federal Judicial Center see http://www.fjc.gov/ 
library/fjc_catalog.nsf. Shortly before this article went to press, the Senate passed S. 2611, which, in 
§ 707, requires the Comptroller General of the GAO to study the appellate process for immigration ap-
peals. The bill requires that the Comptroller General consider consolidating all BIA appeals and habeas 
corpus petitions in immigration cases into one U.S. Court of Appeals. Comprehensive Immigration Re-
form Act, S. 2611, 109th Cong. § 707 (2006). 
137. See DORSEY & WHITNEY, LLP, supra note 19. 
138. See Lenni B. Benson, You Can't Get There From Here, U. Cm. LEGAL F. (forthcoming Oct. 2007). 
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tedly, Congress usually focuses on the goal of immigration enforcement. Our sys-
tem of government should be responsive enough to the concerns of sophisticated 
interested parties to be able to fashion a system that will respond to these con-
cerns, yet remain flexible enough to respond to the changes necessitated by manip-
ulation or government inefficiency. The immigration adjudication system must 
have the ability to respond to varied levels of agency enforcement, respond to 
patterns in international affairs, and acknowledge the differences in the claims of 
those only recently arrived and those who have spent most of their lives in the 
United States. The system should construct a mechanism for adapting to patterns 
of abuse and allow for government mechanisms to fairly respond to those abusers. 
Congress should spend its energy on this goal rather than spend millions on liti-
gating the illusion of a solution through court stripping. If only the agencies 
would stop treating the people in the system as just so much paper to move for-
ward. Put down your shears and paper. Recognize the humans in the "aliens" -
they are not and cannot be merely paper dolls. 
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